ART. 75] EXTENDING JUDGMENTS. 1675

forthwith return their inquisition uuder their hands and seals and the
court shall order such judgment to be extended in accordance with the
terms of such finding of the jury.

Errors and irregularities.

A fi. fa. and an attachment held invalid because there was no entry of an
interlocutory judgment before the inquisition, nor any final judgment
rendered upon the inquisition. Griffith v. Lynch, 21 Md. 578.

Where an order under the act of 1794, ch. 46, charges the Jury to inquire
of the damages, omitting "and costs", and the inquisition Is for damages
"and about ten dollars for costs", these are mere formal defects which may
be cured by amendment. Kiersted v. Rogers, 6 H. & J. 287. And see Harris

v. Jaffray, 3 H. & J. 543.

Where the Judge assesses the damages without a Jury, the declaration
containing the common counts and a special count claiming unliquidated
damages, the appellate court will assume in the absence of all proof to the
contrary, that the court in assessing damages proceeded under the common
counts, and not under the special count. How the question of such irregu-
larity should be raised. Homer v. O'Laughlin. 29 Md. 472.

Generally.

The act of 1794, ch. 46. places the inquisition on a judgment by default on
the same footing with other jury trials. Parties may pray the opinion of
the court, take bills of exception and appeal as in other cases. The inquisi-
tion may be set aside for the same grounds as would avail on motion for a
new trial. Excessive damages. Evidence. Green v. Hamilton, 16 Md. 330.

The act of 1794, ch. 46. assumes, and proceeds on the theory that all inter-
locutory judgments, where inquisitions are required to give them effect,
establish the plaintiff's right to recover without regard to the amount the
jury may ascertain to be due. A judgment by default if regularly entered,
is as binding as any other as far as respects the power and Jurisdiction of
the court in declaring the plaintiff entitled to recover. Heffner v. Lynch, 21
Md. 555; Green v. Hamilton, 16 Md. 329.

Where the parties fix the amount of the recovery by agreement, the inqui-
sition is waived and final Judgment may be entered. The final judgment
does not relate back and take effect as of the date of judgment by default,
and the latter Judgment is not a lien on the defendant's property. Davidson
v. Myers, 24 Md. 554.

Where three years have elapsed since a judgment by default, although
there is no change of parties, the judgment should be revived and extended
by a sci. fa. Bridges v. Adams, 32 Md. 580.

This section contains no limitation as to the time in which inquisitions on
judgments by default must be had. The act of 1864. ch. 175. applies to
Judgments entered by default prior to its passage. There is no obligation
upon the court to delay entering judgment upon an inquisition, although it
may delay where occasion requires. Stansbury v. Keady. 29 Md. 367.

The amount of damages assessed by the court without a Jury under this
section and a practice act of Baltimore city, is not open for revision on
appeal when no exception on that ground was taken, unless the damages
exceed the amount claimed in the declaration. Morris v. Wrenschall, 34 Md.
502.

The act of 1794, ch. 46, is remedial, and does not interfere with the statute
of VIII. and IX. William III, ch. 11, providing for the assessment of damages
where there is a Judgment by default in an action on a bond with collateral
conditions. Wilmer v. Harris, 5 H. & J. 8.

The act of 1794. ch. 46. did not give the right to an inquiry of damages
where none existed before. Hopewell v. Price. 2 H. & G. 276.

Cited but not construed in Martindale v. Brock, 41 Md. 581.

See art. 26, sec. 18.

1004, art. 75. sec. 90. 1888. art. 75. sec. 87. 1860. art. 75. sec. 63.
1785. ch. 80. sec. 13.

90. Tn all cases of actions brought for the penalty of any bond, bill
covenant or contract with penalty, the jury may, under the direction