1650 PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCESS AT LAW. [ART. 75
The opposite party is only entitled to over in those cases in which before
the adoption of this sub-section, profert was necessary. Oyer can not prop-
erly be craved of a bond which is a public record, but if it is craved, the
demand may be complied with by a certified copv. State v. Wilson, 107 Md.
131.
107. Either party may use the common law forms, or the forms
hereinbefore given, at his election; and either party may require a bill
of particulars where the pleading is so general as not to give sufficient
notice to the opposite party of the evidence to be offered in support
of it.
This sub-section is but the expression of the previous rule of practice.
When a bill of particulars is properly demandable. Black v. Woodrow, 39
Md. 212.
This sub-section does not require that the bill of particulars disclose the
plaintiff's witnesses. Office and effect of a bill of particulars. Cairnea v.
Pelton, 103 Md. 44.
The first clause of this sub-section referred to in deciding that the actions
of debt and assumpsit could not be joined. Smith v. State, 66 Md. 219.
108. Whenever the partnership of any parties, or the incorporation
of any alleged corporation, or the execution of any written instrument
filed in the case is alleged in the pleadings in any action or matter at
law, the same shall be taken as admitted for the purpose of said action
or matter, unless the same shall be denied by the next succeeding plead-
ing of the opposite party or parties.
There must be a specific denial of the partnership, incorporation or the
execution of any written instrument, or such matter is admitted. The filing
of the general issue plea is not a sufficient denial. Fifer v. Clearfield Co..
103 Md. 3; Banks v. McCosker, 82 Md. 525; Junkins v. Sullivan, 110 Md.
545; Abbott v. Bowers, 98 Md. 527.
Where the declaration charges the execution of an agreement by A as the
agent of B, and the defendant does not in his pleas specifically deny the
execution of such agreement, such execution is admitted, but not that A was
the agent of B with authority to bind the latter as alleged in the narr.
Fifer v. Clearfield Co., 103 Md. 3.
This sub-section has no application where there is no allegation in the
narr. of the execution of any instrument, but the mere averment that the
defendant "guaranteed the payment of the mortgage debt." Commonwealth
Bank v. Kirkland, 102 Md. 668.
In a suit brought under a local practice act. the denial in the defendant's
affidavit of the execution of an instrument filed with the narr., compels the
plaintiff to prove such execution. The procedure provided by the prac-
tice act is complete in Itself, and exclusive of this sub-section. Homer v.
Plumley. 97 Md. 282; Farmers' Bank v. Hunter, 97 Md. 150; Nicholson v.
Snyder, 97 Md. 420.
This sub-section applied in a suit on a promissory note under the practice
net for Baltimore city. Abbott v. Bowers, 98 Md. 527. And see McCarty v.
Harris, 93 Md. 741; Junkins v. Sullivan, 110 Md. 545.
Where a policy of Insurance which is the basis of the action is set out in
the declaration and its execution is not denied in the plea, its execution is
admitted for the purposes of the action. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Devoe, 98 Md.
588; Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Conowingo Co.. 113 Md. 438.
Under this sub-section, the mere production of the promissory note sued
on makes a prima facie case which, unless rebutted, entitles the plaintiff to
recover. Frederick Institution v. Michael. 81 Md. 505 (dissenting opinion).
This sub-section applied so as to obviate proof of the incorporation of
the defendant. Norfolk, etc.. R. R. Co. v. Hoover. 79 Md. 267.
Cited but not construed in Zihlman v. Cumberland Glass Co., 74 Md. 307.
For a similar section applicable to cases before justices of the peace, see
art. 52, sec. 33.
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