ART. 57] PATENTS. 1401

of such d'eceased debtor as to the claims go paid until the lapse of eigh-
teen months after the filing of said bill.

The statute is suspended in favor of a creditor against an heir and
devisees. Case saved by this section from the operation of the statute.
Eirley v. Eirley, 102 Md. 454; Thompson v. Dorsey, 4 Md. Ch. 151.

The period allowed by the statute having expired before the bill for a
sale of real estate was filed, this section held to have no application. Simms
. v. Lloyd, 58 Md. 480.

This section regarded as prospective. Shepherd v. Bevans, 4 Md. Ch. 411.

1904, art. 57, sec. 9. 1888, art. 57. sec. S. 1860, art. 57, sec. 8. 1814, ch. 122, sec. 3.

9. The time intervening between the petitioning of an insolvent
debtor and the time when his petition may be dismissed shall not be
computed on any plea of limitation so as to defeat the claim of any
person against such debtor.

Ibid. sec. 10. 1888, art. 57, sec. 9. 1860, art. 57, sec. 9. 1818, ch. 90.

1849. ch. 424.

10. Whenever land shall be taken up under a common or special
warrant, or warrant of re-survey, escheat or proclamation warrant, any
person, body politic or corporate may give in evidence under the gen-
eral issue his possession thereof; and if it shall appear in evidence that
the person, body politic or corporate, or those under whom they claim
have held the lands in possession for twenty years before the action
brought, such possession shall be a bar to all right or claim derived
from the State under any patent issued upon such warrant; but nothing
herein contained shall apply to any warrant laid before the 26th day of
January, 1819.

If the possession is not under color of title, twenty years' exclusive adverse
possession by actual enclosures must be shown. Newman v. Young's Lessee,
30 Md. 420. See also, Davis v. Furlow's Lessee, 27 Md. 546.

When a party entitled to the benefit of this section, ought not to have his
title clouded by a subsequent grant upon an escheat warrant Armstrong v.
Bittinger, 47 Md. 111. See also, Hoye v. Swan, 5 Md. 244; Dorothy v.
Hillert, 9 Md. 574; Jay v. Van Bibber, 94 Md. 695.

Quaere whether plaintiffs as well as defendants can avail themselves of the
act of 1818, ch. 90, and as to whether that act is a grant or confirmation of
title. The act of 1818, ch. 90, was not repealed by the act of 1839, ch. 4.
The former act held under the admitted facts, not to relieve the plaintiff
from showing that there was no such outstanding title in the state as bars
recovery. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1 Md. 53.

The proprietary could not be affected by adverse possession before the
land had been granted. Steuart v. Mason, 3 H. & J. 507.

This section applied. Chapman v. Hosklns, 2 Md. Ch. 493.

For the law prior to the adoption of this section, see Hall v. Glttings.
2 H. & J. 112; Cheney v. Ringgold, 2 H. & J. 87; Russell v. Baker, 1 H. & J.
71; Kelly v. Greenfield, 2 H. & McH. 121; Tasker v. Whittington, 1 H. &
McH. 151.

Cited but not construed in Jay v. Van Bibber, 94 Md. 695; Hepburn's
Case, 3 Bl.111; Campbell's Case, 2 Bl. 237.

As to a ground-rent being extinguished by a failure to collect for twenty
years, see art. 53, see. 26.

Actual enclosure is no longer necessary to adverse possession—art 75, sec.
79. See also, art. 54, sec. 20 et seq.

As to adverse possession, see Brantly's Digest.