1396 LIMITATION Oi1 ACTIONS. [ART. 57

for property, conveyed as indemnity); Hall v. Creswell, 12 G. & J. 51 (claims
in equity); Baltimore, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Barnes, 6 H. & J. 60 (subscrip-
tion to stock); West v. Jarrett, 3 H. & J. 486 (rents and profits); Ratrie v.
Sanders, 2 H. & J. 327 (replevin); Cawood v. Whetcroft, 1 H. & J. 103
(assumpsit); Thompson v. Dorsey, 4 Md. Ch. 151 (charge for board); White
v. White, 1 Md. Ch. 56 (bill for account for sales of stock). Cf. Baltimore v.
Ulman, 79 Md. 482; Donaldson v. Raborg, 26 Md. 326; Hoffman v. Smith, 1
Md. 492; Baltimore, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Barnes, 6 H. & J. 60.

If a plaintiff mistakes his remedy, and pending the action limitations
runs, he is barred. Wlllard v. Wood, 164 U. S. 523.

For a waiver of the statute of limitations, see Cape Sable Co.'s Case, 3
Bl. 672; Welch v. Stewart, 2 Bl. 41; Strike's Case, 1 Bl. 57.

For a case discussing the legislative power to pass a law which revives a
debt which has become barred by limitations, see Hagerstowu v. Sehner,
37 Md. 189.

Where fraud is relied on to remove the bar of the statute, resort must be
had to equity. (This case was decided before the adoption of section 14).
Negro Franklin v. Waters, 8 Gill, 331.

Article 53, section 26, construed in connection with this' section—see
notes thereto. Safe Deposit Co. v. Marburg, 110 Md. 413.

Cited but not construed in Wlllard v. Wood. 135 U. S. 309.

For the time within which the discharge of an insolvent may be attacked
for fraud, see art. 47, sec. 21.

1904, art. 57, sec. 2. 1S8S. art. 57. sec. 2. 1860, art. 57, sec. 2. 1715, ch. 23, sec. 3.
1818, ch. 216. 1884. ch. 502. 1890, ch. 548. 1894, ch. 661.

2. If any person entitled to any of the actions mentioned in the
preceding section shall be at the time such cause of action accrues
within the age of one and twenty years or non compos, he or she shall
be at liberty to bring the said action within the respective times so
limited after the disability is removed, as other persons having no such,
disability might or should have done.

When the statute once begins to run, no subsequent disability will arrest
it unless so provided by statute. Maurice v. Worden, 52 Md. 294; Fink v.
Zepp, 76 Md. 185; Lurman v. Hubner. 75 Md. 272. See also, Gump v. Sibley,
79 Md. 169; Dempsey v. McNabb, 73 Md. 438; Stewart v. Spedden, 5 Md.
448; Young v. Mackall, 4 Md. 374; Ruff v. Bull, 7 H. & J. 16.

A party is protected by the disability that exists at the time his right of
action first accrues, and if there are several disabilities at such time, the
statute does not begin to run until the party has survived them all. The
operation of the statute can not, however, be prevented by cumulative disa-
bilities. Dugan v. Gittlngs, 3 Gill, 160.

The act of 1818, ch. 16, is constitutional. It repealed the saving clause as
to persons "beyond the seas." Such persons had three years from the passage
of the act in which to bring suit. (See section 7). Frey v. Kirk, 4 G. &
J. 521. See also. Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 558; Mason v. Union Mills Co., 81
Md. 450; Pancoast v. Addison. 1 H. & J. 352; Brent v. Tasker, 1 H. & McH.
89; Coursey v. Wright, 1 H. & McH. 394; Bank of Alexander v. Dyer, 14
Pet 141.

The statutory period having expired after the disability was removed,
limitations is a bar. Hertle v. McDonald. 2 Md. Ch. 133; Bovd v. Harris,
2 Md. Ch. 214.

This section applied as to infancy. Chambers v. Woodberry Co., 106 Md.
497; Welch v. State. 5 H. & J. 369.

Cited but not construed in Smith v. Williamson, 1 H. & J. 150.

Ibid. sec. 3. 1888. art. 57, sec. 3. 1860. art. 57. sec. 3. 1715, ch. 23, sec 6.

1729. ch. 24, secs. 21. 22. 1818, ch. 216. 1890. ch. 548.

1894, ch. 661. 1904, ch. 414.

3. No bill, testamentary, administration or other bond (except
sheriffs and constables' bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute mer-