1388 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. [ART. 57

When statute begins to run.

The statute begins to run from the time the cause of action arises, aud
not from the time the promise is made. Young v. Mackall, 3 Md. Ch. 399;
Murdock v. Winter, 1 H. & G. 471.

Limitations runs from the date of a promissory note payable on demand,
but only from the date of demand on a certificate of deposit so payable.
Fells Point Savs. Institution v. Weedon, 18 Md. 326.

A usage to the effect that deposits at a bank are only payable upon
demand, prevents the running of the statute against such deposits until
payment has been refused or some act done dispensing with the demand,
which must be brought to the knowledge of the depositor. Planters' Bank
v. Farmers' Bank, 8 G. & J. 467.

When a bank notifies a depositor that his claim will not be paid, a
demand is dispensed with, and the statute begins to run at once. Farmers'
Bank v. Planters' Bank, 10 G. & J. 441; Planters' Bank v. Farmers' Bank.
8 G. & J. 467.

Where a contract is to be performed when the same is demanded, limita-
tions begins to run from the time demand is made. An equitable qualifica-
tion of this rule discussed, where the demand is delayed an unreasonable
time. Rhiud v. Hyndman, 54 Md. 530.

Where a debtor endorses a promissory note payable on demand to his
creditor in part payment of a debt, the creditor is not bound to make
demand on the day the note is endorsed to him, and the statute only begins
to run after a reasonable time for the making of a demand has expired.
Mudd v. Harper, 1 Md. 111.

The statute begins to run from the date of a loan to be returned "when
called on to do so." Damall v. Magruder, 1 H. & G. 439.

The statute begins to run In favor of a guarantor from the time he is
liable to suit, which may or may not be the same time the principal becomes
so liable. Where the principal makes a part payment before the statute
hns attached, the statutory period as against the guarantor or surety, is
extended. When the statute begins to run in favor of guarantors. Hooper
v. Hooper, 81 Md. 170.

The statute begins to run against an endorser of a note, or a surety, from
the time he makes payment. Bullock v. Campbell, 9 Gill, 183. As to sure-
ties, see also, Schlndel v. Gates, 46 Md. 614; Hall v. Creswell, 12 G. & J. 49.
Where one joint maker of a note pays it, the statute begins to run as
against his right to contribution, from the date of such payment. Brady v.
Brady, 110 Md. 665; Hooper v. Hooper, 81 Md. 155.

Where goods are sold with an agreement that a note will be given for
them maturing in 90 days, but no such note is given, and a suit is brought
more than three years after the sale, but less than three years before the note
would have matured, the statute is not a bar. Appleman v. Michael, 43
Md. 279.

Where one partner pays out money in behalf of the firm, limitations only
begins to run as against his right to sue his co-partner from the time
an account is settled and a balance ascertained. Holloway v. Turner, 61
Md. 222.

Where a claim for services against a deceased is founded simply on an
implied obligation, the statute begins to run from the time the services are
performed. Dempsey v. McNally. 73 Md. 438.

The statute only begins to run against an administrator from the time
he takes out letters. Rockwell v. Young, 60 Md. 566.

The statute begins to run on the liability of a stockholder on his sub-
scription to stock, from the time calls are made. Glenn 1;. Williams. 60 Md.
120. See also. Taggart v. Western Md. R. R. Co., 24 Md. 597.

Where the purchaser of stock fails to have it transferred on the books of
the company and the seller is subsequently compelled to pay an assessment,
the statute begins to run against the latter's suit against the purchaser,
from the time of such payment. Hutzler v. Lord, 64 Md. 543.

In an action of trover, the statute begins to run from the conversion,
unless perhaps the plaintiff has been prevented by the fraud of the defend-
ant from knowing of the conversion. (See section 14). Belt v. Marriott
9 Gill, 338.