1218 INSOLVENTS. [AET. 47

preferences, with the exceptions aforesaid, shall be void, howsoever the
same may be made; provided, the grantor or party creating said lien
or preference shall be proceeded against under section 23 of this article,
or shall apply for the benefit of this article under section 1 within four
months after the recording of the deed or conveyance or the creation
of said lien or preference, and shall be declared or shall become, under
the provisions of this article, an insolvent; provided, that nothing in
this section shall apply so as to set aside or render invalid the lien of
any such judgments, mortgage or other conveyance executed by the
debtor for money bona fide loaned or paid at the time of the creation
of such judgments, mortgage or conveyance, but such shall remain a
valid and subsisting lien, although the debtor may be proceeded against
under or may apply for the benefit of this article.

When conveyances, etc. are fraudulent and void.

If the conveyances are in other respects valid and there are no proceed-
ings in insolvency within the prescribed time, the conveyances are good. The
term "insolvency" as used in this section means an inability to pay debts as
they become due in the ordinary course of business. Intention of this sec-
tion; when a party subjects himself to its provisions. Castleberg v. Wheeler,
68 Md. 275.

An attempt to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent and made in contem-
plation of insolvency, denied. What must be established to avoid such a
conveyance? Lapse of time between the conveyance and the application in
insolvency. Powles v. Dilley, 9 Gill, 231; Beatty v. Davis, 9 Gill, 218; Mal-
colm v. Hall, 9 Gill, 180; Powles v. Dilley, 2 Md. Ch. 123; Glenn v. Baker,
Md. Ch. 76. And see Brooks v. Thomas, 8 Md. 371; Dulaney v. Hoffman, 7
G. & J. 175; Hickley v. Farmers' Bank, 5 G. & J. 380.

It is immaterial whether the preferences appear upon the face of a writ-
ten instrument, or are created by payments, transfers or otherwise, they are
all void. When they are made the basis of an adjudication, the latter ipso
facto strikes them down. Vogler v. Rosenthal, 85 Md. 45. See also, Apple-
garth v. Wagner, S6 Md. 475.

A judgment to the effect that a party is not entitled to a discharge because
of having made a deed to B. which was a preference, is not an adjudication
in rem and conclusive upon the rights of B. The status of the property is
not involved in such verdict and it is not evidence against B. After the
lapse of twenty years an insolvent estate is presumed to be closed, and
equity will not entertain a bill to set aside conveyances made by the Insol-
vent before his application unless it is satisfied that there are subsisting
debts due by the insolvent. Both the intent to take the benefit of insolvency
and to give an unlawful preference, must appear to bring an act under this
section. Proximity of time as an element in determining such Intent. Syes-
ter v. Brewer, 27 Md. 313. See also, Maennel v. Murdock, 13 Md. 177; Powles
v. Dilley, 9 Gill, 222.

Whatever is the necessary consequence of an act deliberately done, the
law presumes every man to Intend. When the quo animo becomes an infer-
ence of law. Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill, 404

The fact that a debtor at the time he executed a conveyance could not
apply for the benefit of the insolvent laws, is a strong circumstance to prove
that it was not executed in contemplation of insolvency. Glenn v. Baker, 1
Md. Ch. 76.

The reservation in a deed for the benefit of creditors of a fee for the
draftsman of the deed is a preference. Wolfsheimer v. Rivinus, 64 Md. 235.

For conveyances, etc.. held to be preferences and void, see Clark Co. v.
Colton, 91 Md. 207; Applegarth v. Wagner, 86 Md. 475; Whedbee v. Stewart,
40 Md. 421.

For conveyances held to be bona fide, and hence within the proviso con-
tained in the last clause of this section, see Nicholson v. Schmucker, 81 Md
464; Hinkleman v. Fey, 79 Md. 114.