140 court of appeals of maryland

of Appeals became the law of the land, whether that or their
reasoning was or was not correct; and where the reasoning was
bad, it was too often blended with the decision of the court,
and considered likewise as the law.

Chancellor Alexander Contee Hanson had ex-
pressed another view a few years previously.¹⁸

He may be mistaken with respect to those principles [under
discussion], which indeed the Court of Appeals has not ex-
plained; but he flatters himself that the important tribunal of
the Court of Appeals, on reflection, will perceive the propriety
of always explaining the ground on which they reverse a decree,
in order that the Chancellor may in all future causes obey
them, as his duty requires him to do.

And, again, he laments that tribunals whose deci-
sions are to govern other tribunals, do not give
their opinions at large on every point. But cases
continued to be decided without opinions,¹⁹ and
there were opinions in other cases, sometimes only
a few lines, but adequate, sometimes much longer.
The act of 1832, chapter 302, concerning the re-
manding of cases for further proceedings without
affirmance or reversal, contained a special require-
ment that the judges should when doing so "de-
clare the opinion of the Court of Appeals," and
the provision is still contained in the statute as it
is embodied in the state code, article 5, section 42.
It was not taken as a requirement of an opinion
in writing. One judge often filed an opinion for
the whole court, and it was not unusual, on the
other hand, for more than one judge, or for all

18. 2 Harris & Johnson, 50, 52 and 307.

19. In the National Intelligencer of March 1, 1836, Daniel Webster,
reviewing the work of the Supreme Court of the United States at
a term just ended, remarked that in sixty-five cases disposed of
there were forty-six written opinions besides several oral judg-
ments.