274 SEVENTH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

of Harford County, and two color corporals, Solomon Rohrer of Co. I, and S. M. Dick of
Co. H. Two color corporals were wounded, but the colors were saved.

From first to last, the enemy's fire appeared to be mainly concentrated upon the
mounted officers and color bearers; of these, not one escaped.

Assault Renewed.

Griffin's division came up shortly after Robinson's, and went in on his right. Their
attack was repulsed with even greater loss. One regiment in particular, the gallant
Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which had several men bayonetted inside the works, actually
lost fifty-seven in killed and mortally wounded alone.

Crawford's division, coming up after Griffin, had, at first, more success on the left,
driving the enemy (Humphrey's brigade) for some distance and taking many prisoners.

It was this temporary success which encouraged Colonel Phelps, at that time
wounded and under guard to the rear, to make the last of those attempts at escape,
before mentioned. But Humphrey, being reinforced by Ramseur, regained the lost
ground and drove back the Pennsylvania Reserves (Crawford's division) to the main
line, which was speedily entrenched.

Practical Suggestions.

Such was the first assault upon the enemy's works at Spotsylvania, 8th of May,
1864, sometimes called the battle of Laurel Hill. It was the first of a long series, almost
uniformly with similar result, well illustrating the cardinal maxim of war, "Never do
exactly what your enemy wants."

It is questionable whether, with the modern improved fire-arms, any such assault
will be ever again attempted. If it should be, the following principles of common sense
are suggested by the practical experience above mentioned :

1. The supreme effort should not be exacted of men in bad physical condition,
when such condition is one of extremity.

2. The works should be breached in places by artillery before the infantry attack.

3. No dismounting of individual officers should be allowed, unless in the discre-
tion of the general it is proper for all to dismount, which will probably be the case
hereafter.

4. The men should be told beforehand exactly what is expected of them, and how
many minutes they will be exposed, provided they keep moving and hold their fire.
They should be especially cautioned that the delay of aiming and firing only increases
the risk, and should be encouraged to hope that great celerity of movement, the exhibi-
tion of bayonets fixed, and a bold front, may demoralize the enemy, cause him to
shoot high, and in all ways diminish their own risk.

5. The standing order against quitting the ranks to help wounded off the field
should, in all such cases, be strictly and literally enforced by a provost guard conspicuously
present, supplemented by an ambulance corps known to be at hand, and known to be
adequate.

6. If such conditions cannot be had, any officer who orders an attack in front?
upon steady troops behind cover, should be held strictly responsible for the resulting
disaster, and should not be allowed to throw the blame upon his men.