The New Board: 1864-1920 61
The issue had political, economic, regional, and philosophical overtones; indeed,
so many of the delegates and so much of the political establishment had ties of one
sort or another with the canal company, or its chief competitor the B & O, that the
precise motives of the various functionaries are not altogether clear. What is clear is
that the opponents of the "giveaway" won. Not only was the proposed language re-
jected, but there was added to section 2 of the proposed article a specific nullification
of chapter 359.5
There was virtually no discussion in the convention of the other internal im-
provement companies, except in the context of the C & O issue. The committee had
made a number of changes in the language pertaining to them, however, which were
adopted without question or debate.
Sections 52 and 53 of article 3 of the Constitution of 1864 drew a careful distinction
between and among the B & 0, the C & O, other internal improvement companies,
and the banks. As to the B & O, the board was authorized, without any further action
by the General Assembly, to exchange "the State's interest as stockholder and creditor"
for "an equal amount of the bonds or registered debt now owing by the State." Its
authority to sell the state's interest in other internal improvement companies and in
the banking corporations, however, was "subject to such regulations and conditions
as the General Assembly may from time to time prescribe." That was one distinction.
Another concerned the manner of sale. In disposing of bank stock, the board was
authorized to exchange it for state bonds "equal in amount to the price obtained for
the State's said interest." Interests in the other improvement companies had to be sold
for cash, however, and as to the C & O the Constitution envisioned a sale to the four
counties bordering the upper Potomae. The sale of any canal securities had to be
ratified by the General Assembly.
The new Constitution, in section 3 of article 12, (1) limited the board's authority
to exchange the B & O stock to the 6 percent preferred, thus precluding an exchange
of the common stock and bonds owned by the state, (2) required that the exchange be
at not less than either the par or the market value of the stock, (3) excepted the state's
interest in the Washington Branch of the railroad from any sale, and (4) by subtle
punctuation changes, empowered the board to exchange the state's interests in other
improvement companies for state bonds. The requirement of legislative ratification of
the sale of canal securities was continued.
As in the 1864 Constitutional Convention, there was hardly any discussion about
public works in any context other than the railroad, canal, and bridge companies. The
authority of the board to "hear and determine such matters as affect the Public Works
of the State, and as the General Assembly may confer upon them the power to decide"
was continued, but it received no attention and elicited no debate. As section 2 of
article 12 makes clear, it was the works of internal improvements that were considered
to be the "public works" of the state. The board never concerned itself with anything
else—not in 1825-28 and not since 1851—and, aside from the added responsibility to
rid the state of its investments in the various companies, there was no suggestion by
the 1867 delegates that it would.
The 1867 Constitution, which was approved by the voters in September 1867 and
took effect on 5 October of that year, did not change the structure of the board, and
there was no interruption in its routine. The traditional, and limited, view of the