100 Board of Public Works

The constitution proposed by the commission made no reference to a board of public
works. In its commentary the commission observed that most of the duties actually
performed by the board were statutory rather than constitutional and concluded that
"they could just as well be conferred upon a board of public works created by statute
as upon a board of public works created by the constitution." The commission expressed
the belief that "the vast majority of decisions made by the Board of Public Works is
not of major importance," that "a high level board of this character is not required for
the purpose of making such decisions, and that an appropriate official or agency should
have the authority to take final action."²

The commission's objection to a constitutionally created board was actually part
of a deeper concern over what it regarded as an inappropriate system of checks and
balances within the executive branch of state government. It decried the division of
significant executive power and responsibility among three constitutional officers and
urged instead that all such power emanate from the governor. In that vein it also
recommended that the comptroller and the treasurer be appointed by the governor,
which, of itself, would have significantly undercut the status and political attractive-
ness of the board to the General Assembly. The commission had no objection to a
statutory board of some type to coordinate particular matters, but it felt that such a
board ought not to have constitutional status.

The recommendations of the commission were widely publicized. Ultimately a
constitutional convention was called. It met from 12 September 1967 to 10 January
1968 and produced a proposed new constitution very much like that recommended by
the commission, although after considerable debate a restructured board of public
works was included among its provisions. Most of the debate in this area revolved
around the status of the comptroller, and to a lesser degree the treasurer, and thus
affected the board indirectly and from that perspective.

The convention's Committee on the Executive Branch ultimately recommended
to the convention that the comptroller and the treasurer (and the attorney general)
be appointed by the governor and thus lose their independent political base. Consistent
with that determination and the philosophy behind it, the committee also recom-
mended "that the Board of Public Works not be provided for in the constitution." The
reason assigned to this recommendation reflected the thinking of the precursor com-
mission—that the vesting of significant executive power "in a three-man board not
responsible to the Governor, the majority of which is not even appointed by the Gov-
ernor, is an unwarranted dilution of the Governor's executive authority and respon-
sibility."³

These recommendations were by no means unanimous. Several minority reports
emanated from the committee, recommending constitutional status for the comptroller
and treasurer and the continuation of a board of public works. The minority report
dealing with the board echoed to some extent the majority's concern over dilution of
the governor's power, and it therefore suggested that membership on the board be
increased to five, with the governor appointing the two new members.⁴