xcii PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY

due the crown, bonds given into any office in the province or debts due persons
under age, without sound mind or beyond the seas and not returning within five
years. 34

In Plater v. Ryley, in the November 1696 court, an action of trespass on the
case for an attorney's fee incurred in March, 1691 transmitted out of Calvert
County Court, defendant's attorney pleaded that plaintiff was barred by the 1695
law limiting actions. Plaintiff's attorney thereupon demurred in law to defendant's
plea, giving as reason that the plea was "Altogether insuffitient for that the Same
is a Spetiall plea and by the Law ought to have been Spetially pleaded" and de-
manded judgment against the defendant. Defendant joining in the demurrer,
the court gave judgment that plaintiff take nothing by his writ. In Catterton,
Administrator v. Jones, an action of trespass on the case heard at the September
1697 court, the pleading followed a different course. Defendant's counsel pleaded
the above act in bar of the action and, in the usual language of a special plea in
bar, demanded judgment if plaintiff ought to have his action. Plaintiff's counsel
in replication pleaded that "he ought not to be debarred from haveing his Action
aforesaid by anything in the defendants plea aforesaid pleaded And of this he
prayes may be Inquired into by the Court." Defendant joining in the prayer,
the court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Substantially the same procedure was
followed in Brent's Administratrix v. Waford, in the January 1697/8 term. How-
ever, in Battson v. Stafford in the October 1699 court defendant's counsel pleaded
the above act in bar of the action, without using the usual language for a special
plea in bar, and then put himself upon the court, as did the plaintiff. The court
upheld the plea in bar.35

Several cases of special pleas in bar involved actions against administrators. In
Lyles v. Small, Administrator, in the January 1696/7 court, defendant appeared
in person and averred that he did not have assets of the decedent, William Cooper,
in his hands sufficient to satisfy and pay the debt demanded in the declaration (a
plea of plene administravit) but desired that plaintiff might have judgment when
assets of the estate came into his hands. The court gave judgment for the sum sued
for, plus damages, "to be Levied of the goods and Chatties which were of the Said
William Cooper at the time of his Death when to the hands of the Said David
Small in time to Come Shall happen to Come to be Administered." In Stone v.
Edmundson's Administrator, in the August 1698 court, defendant appeared in
person and stated that he had fully administered all the goods and chattels of de-
cedent which had come into his hands, at the time of the issuance of the original
writ and at any time thereafter, and of this he was ready to aver. Thereupon
plaintiff, since defendant had not denied the action nor that he was administrator
of Edmundson's estate, prayed judgment for the debt against the goods and chattels
of decedent when they came into the hands of defendant to be administered, plus
damages. Judgment quando acciderint was so awarded. 36

In a case in the October 1699 term, Barker's Administrator v. Tracey's Admin-
istrator, defendant administrator pleaded that plaintiff ought not to have his
action because defendant had fully administered all the goods and chattels which
belonged to Tracey at the time of his death and he did not have now or at the
time of the issuance of the original writ or at any time thereafter any such goods
and chattels to be administered, and "this he is ready to aver whereupon he desiers
Judgement if the aforesaid Plantiffe ought thereupon to have his action aforesaid

34. 19 MA 209.

35. Infra 81-82, 265-67, 303-05, 566-67.

36. Infra 150-51, 363-64.