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HEPBURN'S CASE, 99
I should without difficulty yield to any assumption of facts, affect-
ing the rights of the state only, in favour of an individual. And
upon the same principles the state may, for itself, waive the bene-
fit of any rules of law or equity which operate in its favour.
As where in a suit instituted in Chancery on a controversy which
arose between the intendant and a purchaser of confiscated proper-
ty, the case was, by a resolution of the General Assembly, direct-
ed to be referred to arbitration; (k) and the arbitrators having
made an award in which they stated, that their powers, under the
resolution, were not sufficiently extensive to enable them to do
complete justice, the case was, by another resolution referred to
the Chancellor with directions to enquire into the principles upon
which the award was founded, and upon consideration of all cir-
cumstances to decree as equity and justice might require. (I)
Upon which the Chancellor declared, that he considered it to be
the meaning of the General Assembly to place him in the room of
the arbitrators, whose powers were defective, and to enlarge the
submission so that complete justice might be done. And therefore
he held, that it would not be consistent with his duty to consider
the case in the same light as if the contest were between two indi-
viduals coming before him for decision according to the princi-
ples established by preceding determinations in Chancery; and
he proceeded to dispose of the case accordingly as an arbitrator
would have done, (m)
In that instance the state not only admitted the facts in favour
of an individual, but also waived all the strict rules of law and
equity of which it might have taken advantage; and liberally di-
rected the case to be submitted to arbitration unembarrassed by any
forms or rules whatever. The resolution under consideration in-
volving a claim upon property in the hands of the state, although
peculiar and special in its nature, must be regarded as a public law
of which the courts are bound to take notice. There are, however,
many instances in which the Legislature has, by private acts, inter-
posed, without prejudice to any private rights, to remove difficul-
ties and give facilities in the disposition of property in which the
state had no interest; by providing modes of leasing, mortgaging
or selling legal or equitable estates of deceased persons for the
payment of their debts, or to save the more profitable personalty;
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(k) Resolution, 1784, Ho. 4.—(I) Resolution 24th May, 1787.—(w) Garretson v.
The Attorney .General 18th August, 1790; Chancery Proceedings, lib. D. fol. 385.
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