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THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE. 663
canst, by the affirmance it becomes a judgment of the Court of
King's Bench; and, as such, an execution may be had thereon
co-extensively with the jurisdiction of that court (u)
But there are cases in which the judgment of an inferior court
may be removed into one of the superior courts for the express
purpose of enabling the plaintiff, by a more general execution, to
reach the property of the defendant lying beyond the limited juris-
diction of the court in which his judgment was obtained. So
that although the land of the defendant, lying beyond those limits,
could not be taken in execution by any writ issuing directly from
such inferior court in which the judgment was rendered; yet as
there is a settled and established course by which it may be made
liable, the lien fastens immediately, as a necessary consequence
of that liability, without regard to the circuitous course whereby
alone such liability may be made effectual.
In the case of a statute merchant, statute staple, or recogni-
zance, which, in England, have obtained the name of pocket
judgments, if the conusor be out of the jurisdiction of the mayor,
or cannot be found within the staple, or has no property within
those limited jurisdictions, the statute or recognizance may be cer-
tified and sent under seal into Chancery, whence execution may
be issued against the lands and tenements, goods and chattels of
the conusor returnable to the King's Bench, or Common Pleas.
And, therefore, in all such cases, the lien fastens from the date of
such a pocket judgment; although the mode of making it effec-
tual can only be by removing it from the local tribunal before
which it was rendered, and sending it into one of the superior
courts, there to obtain an execution to be returned into another of
them, (w)
It is obvious, that it could not fail to be attended with very
great inconvenience, in most cases, to every one to be sued
abroad, or at a distance from his place of residence; and espe-
cially where the civil process by which he may be called upon to
answer, authorizes an arrest and detention of his person. To sub-
ject any one to such a course of judicial procedure within any
jurisdiction where he does not reside, places it in the power of
malice to have him imprisoned far away from his home, his friends
(u) Guilliam v. Hardy, 1 Ld. Raym. 216; Cowperthwaite v. Owen, 3 T, R. 657;
2 Harris Entr. 766. —(w) F. N. B. 246; 2 Inst. 23; Bac. Abr, tit Execution, B.
I. 2; Holt v. Murray, 2 Cond, Chan. Rep. 243; 19 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 4, (1779; ) 1835,
ch. 201, s. 10, 11 and 12.
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