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632 THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.
once fastened, through every change, and into all other hands.
The petitioner, therefore, cannot sustain his pretensions upon any
foundation of this kind, (r)
In the case under consideration, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the plaintiffs or the defendants in these executions are
liable to the sheriff for his poundage fees; and the principles upon
which that liability rests.
This court has, in many instances, where it has money in its
hands which it is about to pay over to a party who is liable no fur-
ther than to the amount of such assets; or who is not a resident
of the state, and within the reach of common law process, allowed
a creditor of such a party to come in and obtain payment of his
merely legal claim out of the assets or money of his debtor in this
court. It seemed to be admitted, and indeed I do not see how it
could be denied, that if the plaintiffs in those executions only were
liable for these poundage fees, that there could not, from any thing
alleged or shewn by the petitioner, be the slightest pretext for this
court to entertain jurisdiction of his case, as he has against them
an ample remedy at law. Because it is not shewn, that these pro-
ceeds are specifically bound for those fees, or that they are assets
in respect of which those plaintiffs are chargeable; or that those
plaintiffs are insolvent, or non-residents, and beyond the reach of
ordinary common law process. There is, therefore, nothing in the
petitioner's case which can entitle him to relief upon any such
grounds as against the parties to this suit who are the plaintiffs in
the executions.
But there are other kinds of executions which go against the
person, or do not direct the property of the defendant to be taken
and converted into money, on obeying which the sheriff becomes
entitled to poundage fees. On taking the defendant into custody
under a capias ad satisfaciendum, the sheriff becomes entitled to
poundage fees on the whole amount, (s) And so, too, on execut-
ing a levari facias, an elegit, or a liberate, by virtue of which the
property is not sold, but specifically delivered to the plaintiff in
satisfaction of his claim, (t) In all these cases, as well as in all
those where the execution, after it has been regularly levied, but,
before a sale, has been countermanded; or has been quashed on
account of some previous error in the proceedings; or the suit has
(r) Ridgely v. Iglehart, ante 540, —(s) Peacock v. Harris, 1 Salk. 331. —(t) Tyson
v. Paske, 2 Ld. Raym. 1212.
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