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THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE. 619
It is very true, that those injunctions were intended to free par-
ticular property from the executions; and the reasons are assigned
in the bills why such property should not be liable to the execu-
tions; and no one, for a moment, could doubt, but that the same
grounds applicable to the whole property, real and persona], which
was once completely owned by the defendant at law, would be
protected, if, prior to the judgment, as applicable to the real, or
prior to the fieri facias, as applicable to the personal, he had
parted with the same, so as to vest the equitable interest in him,
or them, who should claim the protection of a court of equity.
The principle on which those injunctions issued was, that the party
applying for them was the equitable owner of the property which
was attempted to be sold to pay the debts of a person who, before
the judgments, had bona fide parted with the property. In those
cases, it was contended, that the complainants were not, at law,
parties; but here, as the complainants claim in virtue of their inte-
rest in The Cape Sable Company, against whom the judgment was
rendered, they were parties to that cause, and as such were not
entitled to an injunction without bond.
It is manifest, from the exhibits filed with the bill, that in point
of fact the complainants were ignorant of the proceedings on which
the judgment was rendered; and, for the reasons disclosed in the
former opinion, those proceedings did not authorize the judgment;
and none would have been obtained, if opposed by those persons
holding one-third of the stock. If it be conceded, that, techni-
cally speaking, at law, all composing the company when a suit is
fairly brought are parties to that suit; yet, it will not follow, that
a court of equity is concluded by the judgment, or precluded from
examining into the real character of the transaction, and applying
the equitable relief the party is entitled. If, in ordinary corpora-
tions, the whole body is represented by the head; yet, it is com-
petent for the Legislature, in forming a new body corporate, to
restrict the powers of the president, and he can only move within
his restrictions; and, if he attempts to go beyond them, and with-
out the power of a court of law to grant redress, it is competent
for this tribunal to interpose. When the act of incorporation
restricted the power to sell and dispose of the property, or mort-
gage the whole, or any part thereof, to the previous consent of
three-fourths of the stockholders holding three-fourths of the shares,
unless the act is rendered totally nugatory, so far as relates to the
restriction, it must prevent the president from voluntarily going
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