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612 THE CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.
course of law. To this allegation In the bill no answer is given
by the defendants; their answer is silent on the subject. In the
answer of the defendants it is stated, that on the 20th of February,
1822, seventeen thousand dollars were due on account of loans to
the company at different periods. When the loans commenced,
and the amount of each, as well as the time of each advance, is
not disclosed, either by the answer, or by any other part of the
transaction. At the time when they begun the situation of the
company was so deplorable, that but for them, the answer alleges,
an entire stop must have been put to the proceedings, to the great
loss and injury of all concerned. Yet take the answer and bill to-
gether, when the situation of the company was so flourishing as
to enable it, in the short space of time a suit would have occupied,
to discharge a debt of $17, 000, an immediate and instantaneous
determination is to put a stop to the works; at least so far as the
interests of the complainants in them extended.
Admitting the facts to be as set forth in the answer, that the
stockholders, at a time of embarrassment and difficulty, authorized
Caton to borrow money to carry on the works; can it follow, from
that authority, that he had a right to such an extent to bring on
ruin and destruction ? In obtaining those loans, was Richard
Caton acting, to use the language of the Supreme Court of the
United States, within the scope of the legitimate purposes of the
institution ? If he was, then the parol contract made by him must
amount to an express promise of the corporation, and lay a founda-
tion for an action. But although he was the agent, if he went be-
yond the scope of his authority, although a loss may be sustained
by those who confided in him, his engagements are not, either ex-
press or implied promises on the part of the corporation, and they
present no foundation for maintaining an action. But, it is not
my province to decide the question of law, whether the plaintiffs
could have obtained judgment at law, if the claim had been
resisted, and the attention of the court called to the subject. I,
therefore, proceed to the second question.
Is the authority given such as to justify the entering of the
judgment ?
la examining this point, I have to disclaim all authority to inter-
fere with the judgments of a court of law; except on equitable
principles; where the court directs a judgment, it is not my pro-
vine to say they were correct, or that they erred. The case un-
der consideration is not of that character. An authority to appear
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