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TESSIER v. WYSE. 61
ceased; and that the defendant Morgaretta Wyse, died on the 19th
of April, 1830, and her representatives, as such, have not been
made parties. Whereupon it was prayed, that the decree might
be rescinded, and the case reheard; and that she might be per-
mitted to answer, &c.
Upon which an order was passed, directing that the matter of
the petition should stand for hearing on the 12th of October then
next; and that all further proceedings under the decree should be
suspended until further order; provided, that a copy be served, &e.
13th October, 1830.—BLAND, Chancellor.—The petition of
Matilda Wyse, standing ready for hearing, and having been sub-
mitted on notes by the solicitors of the parties, the proceedings
were read and considered.
It is admitted, that previous to the death of Margaretta, the
case had been set down for hearing. It is not alleged or shewn,
that the interests of Margaretta did not survive to the other defen-
dants in the case; and besides her representatives, if they are in
fact not these defendants, are not now here complaining of this
decree.
The petitioner does not pretend to have discovered any testi-
mony which she could not have had brought into the case and
used at the hearing; nor does she, in any way, specify what the
nature of that testimony is which she says would have an impor-
tant bearing on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Such general
and indefinite allegations cannot afford a sufficient ground for a
rehearing. Although she was an infant, and had answered only
by her guardian ad litem; yet she had attained her full age nearly
three months before the decree was passed; and even now she
does not impute to her guardian or solicitor any mismanagement,
or neglect of her interests. Under such circumstances, and
without showing any special grounds, this application must be
considered as coming too late, (e)
Formerly on a creditor's bill to obtain the sale of lands charged
with the payment of debts, the decree was never absolute, but
nisi causa as against the infant heir, allowing him six months to
shew cause after he attained his full age; when he was permitted
to come in as a matter of course, and file a better answer, and
have the case reheard upon the merits as thus newly presented;
or the parol was ordered to demur as to the real estate descended
(e) Kemp v. Squire, 1 Ves. 206; Bennet v. Leigh, 1 Dick. 89.
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