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NEALE v. HAGTHROP. 577
indicates, that lie is not altogether trustworthy upon oath; for, in
such case the plaintiff will attain his object much sooner by taking
the answer as it stands, and proceeding directly to collect his
proofs than by stopping to take exceptions. This is the case
where the answer is an evasive or imperfect response; and yet
goes to the whole, and puts in issue all the allegations of the bill*
But to what end, or for what purpose, where no explanation or
discovery is sought for by an allegation, should the plaintiff, by
exceptions, call for an answer to it, when it is impliedly and tacitly
admitted by not being answered? In such case, both parties
would be delayed and troubled, and the defendant put to much ex-
pense without any object whatever.
The general replication puts in issue only the denial or avoid-
ance of the answer; and neither party is allowed, nor can be
called on to adduce proof respecting any matter not put in issue.
The unanswered part of the bill, therefore, must be admitted,
since it cannot be, according to the correct and orderly course
of proceeding, proved at the hearing. But, if the unanswered
allegations of a bill were required to be proved, or to be rejected
altogether at the hearing, then the defendant would be allowed
to take advantage of his own laches; and a want of frankness
would be tolerated and encouraged in a manner altogether un-
becoming a court of equity. The plaintiff would be driven to
except, in all such cases, merely to extract from the defendant
either a general, or an express, instead of a tacit disclaimer or
confession; when, in truth, it might have been the intention of the
defendant, as it is fair to infer it was, to concede the unanswered
allegation for the express purpose of avoiding the costs of an an-
swer, of exceptions and of proofs, by letting a decree by default
go for so much as he had left unanswered.
Formerly when the defendant used only to set forth his own
case in the answer, without answering every clause of the bill, it
was the practice for him to add, at the end of the answer, a general
traverse, without that, that the matters set forth in the bill are
true, &e. But where the whole bill, and every clause in it, has
been fully answered, the adding of a general traverse is rather im-
pertinent than otherwise; and if issue is taken upon this general
traverse, it is a denial only of every thing not answered before by
the answer, (u) But, there is no case in which this general tra-
(u) Anonymous, 2 P. Will. 87.
73 v. 3
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