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NEALE v. HAGTHROP. 571
These authorities appear satisfactorily to sustain this rule, and
to shew, that the defendant cannot be allowed, with impunity or
advantage to himself, to refuse to answer at all; or in any manner
or form to stop short, or to omit to answer any material part of the
plaintiff's case; and that the consequence of such refusal or failure
is, that the whole bill, or so much of it as remains unanswered,
may, at the hearing, be taken pro confesso, (d)
The proceedings in Chancery have been formed according to the
course of the civil law, in some respects, and analogous to the com-
mon law in others; and as to all matters of substance there must be
the same strictness in pleading in equity as at law. (e) Hence it is
not unfrequent, where a case arises as to which former decisions fur-
nish no safe guide, to have recourse to the illustrative analogies of
the common law. (f) Supposing then, that, in relation to this sub-
ject, there was a total absence of all manner of precedent and
authority, the analogous course of the common law would be found
to afford much and strong light.
At common law there are two defaults, the one before, and the
other after appearance. The consequence of the first, in England,
is, that the defendant may be outlawed; and in this state, in many
cases, is, that an attachment may go against his estate. The con-
sequence of the second default, or the defendant's not putting in
any plea at all, is, that the plaintiff may have a judgment by nil
dicit. The plea is called, at common law, the answer of the de-
fendant; and if he fails to answer, judgment is awarded against
him on the ground, that he has thus tacitly admitted, or confessed
the case of the plaintiff; and left him nothing to litigate or to prove.
So, in equity, after an appearance, the taking a bill pro confesso
where no answer has been put in; or no sufficient answer, after
exceptions have been sustained, is analogous to the taking the de-
claration for true, where the defendant has put in no plea at all, or
it has been held insufficient on demurrer, (g)
It is a rule, at common law, that every plea must answer the
whole declaration, or at least every material part of it, which goes
to constitute the gist of the action. But, the defendant may fail,
or purposely decline to plead, or answer to every part of the decla-
(d) Abergavenny v. Abergavenny, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 170; S. C. 1 Harr. Pra. Chan.
277. —(e) Moore v. Hart, 1 Vern. 114; Story v. Windsor, 2 Atk. 682; Dobson v.
Leadbeater, 13 Yes. 233, —(f) Davis v, Davis, 2 Atk. 21; Foster v. Vassall, 9 Atk.
§89; Bayley v. Adams 6 Ves. 504; Dolder v. Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 202, —(g) Davis
v. Davis, 2 Atk. 21; Buckingham v. Peddicord, 2 Bland, 447.
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