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POST v. MACKALL, 517
that -which must injure another; and that equality is equity, provi-
ded the court has any foundation for enforcing such equity without
depriving a party of his clear legal rights, or impairing the obliga-
tion of his contract, (s)
I am therefore of opinion, that the claimant No. 4, cannot, for
the benefit of the other creditors of the deceased, be required to
proceed against and exhaust the fund, or land in the District of
Columbia, which had been mortgaged to them as a security for
their debt, before they are allowed to come here for satisfaction
-out of the proceeds of that fund lying within this state which had
also been mortgaged to them as a security for the same debt.
It appears, that claim No. 11, the voucher of which was filed
on the 30th of October, 1830, is founded on a supersedeas judg-
ment, acknowledged by the deceased on the 17th of April, 1815,
which, after having been suffered to lapse, was revived by scire
facias in 1822. And, consequently, it is now a subsisting lien
upon the real estate of the deceased, not barred by the statute of
limitations, and, as such, is entitled to a preference over all subse-
quent liens, as well as over all the claims of the general creditors.
But the mortgage on which claim No. 4 is founded, bears date
on the 10th of October, 1821, at a time when this judgment must
have so expired, that no execution could have issued upon it; and,
therefore, it could not, after that time, be revived so as to overreach
the mortgage claim No. 4; and thus, upon the principles hereto-
fore laid down by this court, (t) this judgment claim No. 11, can
only be allowed a preference out of the proceeds of the realty, after
the mortgage claim No. 4 has been fully satisfied.
The claims No. 35 and 36, founded on judgments rendered
against the deceased on the 10th of April, 1818, being the eldest
liens upon the realty of the deceased, appear to be entitled to a pre-
ference over all other claims. But The Bank of the United States,
who stands here as claimants No. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, has relied upon
the statute of limitations in opposition to these two claims; the
vouchers of which were not filed until the 13th of January, 1832,
and therefore they are clearly barred. And hence, according to
the rule laid down, in relation to this matter, these claims, No. 35
and 36, can be allowed to obtain no portion of these assets to the
prejudice of any of the claims of the Bank which may be in any
manner, or to any extent sustained as against the estate of the
(s) 2 Fonb. Eq. 298. —(t) Coombs v. Jordon, ante 284,
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