|
|
|
|
|
|
|
POST v. MACKALL. 493
amount of $1, 005, were mortgaged to The Bank of the United States,
as is alleged. They have not been taken out of the possession of
the administrator; and the auditor thinks they should be accounted
for by him, as a part of the personal estate of the intestate, leav-
ing the Bank to prove its claim as it may think proper. The com-
mission allowed is supposed to be correct, as the act of 1798 limits
the allowance to ten per cent, on the amount of the inventory. This
account A. is also supposed to be erroneous, as no interest is
allowed on the amount of the estate in the hands of the adminis-
trator. The auditor has therefore, stated an account B. from which
the aforesaid objectionable items are excluded. The commission
is allowed on the amount of the inventory, and interest charged
from fifteen months after the date of the letters of administration,
To this report, the plaintiffs, whose claims are No. 1, 2, and 3,
on the same day filed the following exceptions. They except to
claim No. 4; because the same is secured by a deed of trust from
the debtor to Richard Smith of certain real estate in the District of
Columbia, where the claimant is situated or resident; and which
is not liable for the claims of the complainants and other general
creditors; and the complainants insist, that the said creditors
should enforce it in the name of said creditor, or that the said
security should be assigned for their benefit before any part of the
fund, created in this cause, should be applied to payment of said
claim. They except to claim No. 5; because it is barred by limi-
tations; and because an absolute judgment was recovered, on the
same cause of action, against Benjamin B. Mackall and Richard
H. Mackall; and the said judgment is evidence, that the personal
estate in the hands of the said administrators was sufficient to pay
said claim; and therefore, bars the said claim as against the real
estate, and the personal estate in the hands of the administrator de
bonis non. They except to claims No. 6 and 7; because they are
not proved in the usual manner; and also for the same reasons
stated in their exceptions to claim No. 5. They except to claim
No. 8; because it is not proved in the usual manner; because it is
barred by limitations; because it was satisfied by the notes of Ben-
jamin B. Mackall, &c. which is stated and mentioned in said claim;
and because it is admitted, that the said claim is secured by a deed
of trust of real estate in the District of Columbia, where the claim-
ant resides or is situated; and the said real estate should be first
applied to the payment of said claim in exoneration of the fund
raised in this cause. They except to claim No. 27; because the
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
