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468 BALTIMORE v. McKIM.
ciently well informed of the law of the office, that here, as in Vir-
ginia (z) a patent gave title, at most, no further than to low water
mark; (a) and that no land, covered by any navigable tide-water,
could be made the subject of a patent from the Land Office of
Maryland, (b) Upon a more careful consideration of the whole
subject, however, it has been finally settled, that the bed of any of
the navigable waters of the state may be granted, and will pass
if distinctly comprehended by the terms of an ordinary patent,
issuing from the Land Office; subject only to the then existing
public uses of navigation, fishery, &c,; which cannot be hindered
or impaired by the patentee, or those claiming under him. (e)
(z) Mead v. Haynes, S Rand. 36.—(a) 2 Hen. Virg. Stat. 456; 1 Hazard's State
Papers, 488.—(b) Land Ho. Assis. 148; Lord Proprietary v. Jenings, 1 H. & McH.
95; Smith u. The State, 2 H. & McH. 251.
RITCHIE v. SAMPLE.—10th July, 1816.—KILTY, Chancellor.—This caveat came
on to be heard in the presence of the parties and by counsel for the defendant. It
appears to be a case of considerable importance in its principles, and it would have
been desirable to have heard counsel on the caveator's side also, so that the pro-
priety of granting a patent, in such a case, might have been more fully examined.
I am, however, of opinion, that the defendant is not entitled to a patent, as the
certificate stands, it being in express terms, for a tract or parcel of the Susquehanna
River, comprehending a number of small islands. And the land covered by the
water cannot be called grantable land; though possibly islands may have been taken
up together, between which the water sometimes flows. It cannot be certainly
known what effect a grant of the ten and a quarter acres would have on the river
and the fisheries. And it is to be observed also, that, under a patent, the defendant
would not be put to a suit to obtain possession, as there would be no person to bring
suit against,
The attempt by Ritchie to take up the same land is not conclusive against him,
as to the right; because he might have been caveated also; neither is his want of
interest, if he has none, an objection, as it is a question involving the propriety of a
grant, and the interest of the public. But the defendant may, on application, have
an order to caveat his certificate.
FOWLER v. GOODWIN.—l9th May, 1809.—KILTY, Chancellor,—The Chancellor
in his decision and order in this case, (1 Bland, 327,) noticed the grounds on which
they had been supported and opposed in the argument before him.
The surveys which were afterwards made at the instance of the caveator, were
laid before him on the submission, without any explanation or further argument.
And he perceived nothing in them to alter the main principle on which he decided.
It has since been suggested by the caveator, that a large part of the surrey, num-
ber one, lies in the water of Bell's Cove, as appears by the plot and explanations,
and the deposition of Charles Stewart. Whereupon, patents were directed to be
issued in the other cases only—meaning number one.
The defendant, if he is desirous of obtaining a patent on that survey, will have to
apply in writing for an order of correction for the purpose of excluding the part so
lying in the water, or for such other order as he may think necessary. And any
order for correction, or any other purpose that may be wanted by the caveator, must
likewise be applied for in writing,
(c) Browne v. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195; 13 Niles' Reg. 225; 1883, ch. 254. s. 7.
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