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46 TESSIER 9. WYSE.
alone. (J) And as this statute deprived infante? of none of their
privileges, it followed, that if any one of the claimants of the real
estate proposed to be charged, was a minor, the parol should demur
for the benefit of all until he attained his full age. So too, as to all
other particulars, not expressly or necessarily embraced by this
statute, the then existing law remained in all respects unaltered.
After which it was declared by an act of Assembly, that persons
under age seised of any lands chargeable with the payment of mo-
ney; and therefore, liable to a decree for a sale, should by direc-
tion of the Court of Chancery, on the petition of the person entitled
to any money with the payment whereof the said lands were charge-
able, convey and assure such lands in such manner as the court
should direct to any other person; and such conveyance should be
as good and effectual as if such infants were at the time of full age:
provided, that no direction, as aforesaid, should be given in ease
of any infants seised of any lands subject to the payment of money,,
unless it should appear that the guardian of such infant had consent-
ed thereunto; and also, that such infant would not sustain any in-
convenience from such direction, (e) Under this law, which relates
only to proceedings in Chancery, any lands, subject to the pay-
ment of debts, held by an infant, might have been sold, with the
consent of his guardian, without allowing to the infant the privi-
lege of having the parol to demur until he attained his full age.
But this act contains not the slightest allusion to any distinction
between the application of the real and personal estate of a de-
ceased debtor to the payment of his debts; nor is susceptible of
being so construed as to have any bearing injurious to the legal
rights of his creditors; or so as to make the least change in that
equity, which arises in a creditor's suit, between the real and per-
sonal representatives of the deceased, by which the heirs are al-
lowed, for their own peculiar benefit, without prejudice to creditors,
to have the personal estate first applied in payment of his debts.
In these respects the then existing principles of la w and equity have
not been altered or affected in any way whatever by this act of
Assembly.
By the act 0f Assembly which prescribes the mode of writing
actions at common law, which may have abated by the death of
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(b) Cox v. Callahan, 2 Bland, 51,note; Long v, Baker, 2 Haywood, 128.—(c)
1773, ch. 7; 1778, ch. 22; Prutzman p. Pitesell,, 3 H, & J. 90; Partridge v. Dorsey,
3 H. & I 320 305 Pue v. Dorsey. 1 Bland. 139 note
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