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MCKIM v. ODOM, 42l
to the general rule in other cases, is received as evidence against
the corporation itself, (g) Thus allowing the plaintiff to select
from among the corporators such one or more of them as he may
think proper to make witnesses, and to extract from them only
such proof as may be entirely responsive to his case.
It is now settled, that a corporation may be charged in actions
ex delicto as well as ex contractu, notwithstanding the general rule,
that they can only act and bind themselves by means of their cor-
porate seal. For although the members of the body politic, in their
corporate capacity, cannot commit a crime, or perpetrate a felony;
yet, since the institution is governed by the intellectual agency of
natural persons, they may cause it so far to depart from the pur-
poses of its establishment, as, by means of its servants to commit
a trespass, or tort, or unlawfully to refuse to make compensation
for that by which it had been, upon its own request, materially
benefited; and, therefore, redress is allowed to be had against it
by an action of trespass, trover, or assumpsit, as may be best
suited to the true nature of the case, (h)
The adjudications by which these modes of proceeding have
been sanctioned, manifest a sensible and strong disposition in the
courts of justice, so to control and modify the ancient distinction
between the artificial and natural capacities of those of whom cor-
porations may be composed, as to prevent them from withholding
a disclosure of the truth; or from perpetrating wrong and fraud,
under cover of their artificial capacity; because of the quaint
notion that, as such, they have no soul; or because, in general,
they can only act, or bind themselves in the manner prescribed by
means of their corporate seal.
On the other hand it may often become necessary to proceed
personally against the officers and members of a body politic, who
have been entrusted with its concerns, so as to prevent them from
exposing its property to seizure and loss by reason of their negli-
gence or contumacy. In a suit against a body politic, which
can only be considered as an auxiliary of the government of the
Republic, it would certainly be very unjust to seize upon its pro-
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(g) Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Ves. 289; Dummer v.. Corporation of Chippenham, 14
Ves. 263,—(h) Com. Dig, tit. Franchises, F. 19; Yarborough v. The Bank of Eng-
land, 16 East. 6; The Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cran. 299; McDonough v.
Templeman, 1 H, & J. 156; The Bank of the United States v. Norwood, 1 H, & J.
423; Kennedy v. The Baltimore Insurance Company, 3 H. & J. 307; Union Bank
of Maryland v. Ridgely, I H. & G. 419.
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