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398 PRICE v. TYSON.
action at common law has been properly originated and now re-
vived against these defendants; and therefore he jus entitled to the
discovery be asks from them.
This, it has been urged, being a mere bill of discovery, in which
the plaintiff asks only for a disclosure of the defendants' knowledge
of a specified fact, they cannot be permitted to set forth, in their
answer, any thing foreign to that special inquiry. If this position
be correct, then every thing in an answer to a bill of this kind,
which cannot be comprehended within the terms of the interroga-
tories propounded, no matter what may be the nature of the case,
must be rejected as irrelevant. The validity of this position,
therefore, presents a preliminary question, which must be deter-
mined before any inquiry can properly be gone into as to how far
the matter objected to may be considered as impertinent in regard
to the whole case as stated by this bill.
If a plaintiff has a right to relief in this court, he has a right to
an answer from the defendant to every allegation of his bill, the
admission of the truth of which, or the proof of the truth of which
is necessary to entitle him to relief, (c) And after having given,
in all respects, such an answer as the bill requires, the defendant
may, and indeed, always should go on, by way of further answer,
to state all matters in bar, or by way of avoidance which he may
make available as a defence against the plaintiff's claim; for it is
a well established rule, that a party cannot be allowed to offer evi-
dence to sustain any allegation which he has not made and relied
upon in his bill or answer, (d) As where to a bill for a specific
performance, although the defendant is bound to answer fully as to
the agreement relied on by the plaintiff; yet he may, by way of
avoidance, and as a defence against the claim presented by the
till, set forth the agreement which was really entered into between
them; and the plaintiff may, if he admits the truth of the defen-
dants' answer, amend his bill and take a decree accordingly upon
the discovery and confession of the defendants. But having, by
his amendment, virtually waived all claim founded on the contract
as set out in his original bill, he cannot be allowed to offer proof
to sustain such claim after the amendment has been made, (e)
The object of a discovery from the defendants for the purpose of
giving relief here, is to obtain evidence in relation to the subject
(c) Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. 37,—(d) Whaley v. Norton, 1 Vern, 483; Sidney v.
Sidney, 3 P. Will,276; Clarke v. Turton, 11 Ves. 240; Smith v. Clarke, 12 Ves.
480.—(e) Lindsay and Lynch, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 9.
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