|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE WHARF CASE. 385
from demanding or receiving any moorage, wharfage, or loll of any
kind, from the owner or holder of any ship or vessel, for laying or
mooring her at, or making her fast to any part of the said wharves
in the proceedings mentioned; and also from demanding or re-
ceiving any wharfage or toll of any description for any goods,
wares, or property landed or placed upon or passed over any part
of the wharves in the proceedings mentioned. Decreed, that The
Mayor and (My Council of Baltimore be and they are hereby
perpetually prohibited and enjoined, &c., (in like manner.) DE-
CREED, that each party pay his and their own costs, to be taxed
by the Register. _____________
From this decree both parties appealed. After which the Gene-
ral Assembly, reciting that a legal dispute existed as to the right
to collect wharfage for the use of a portion of Dugan's wharf and
McElderry's wharf, in the city of Baltimore, and that it was de-
sirable, without prejudice to the right of any of the parties, 50
claiming, to provide for the collection of such wharfage, pending
the said dispute, enacted, that on application as therein prescribed,
the Chancellor should appoint a person to collect wharfage for the
use of the said wharves, &c.; 1831, ch. 328. Thus, evidently,
assuming the fact and the law to be, contrary to the decision of the
Chancellor, that one or the other of these litigating parties must be
entitled to demand and collect wharfage. Upon what constitu-
tional principles can such a legislative enactment be sustained?
The Chancellor submitted and executed this law; because,
although it might not be regarded as a legislative declaration of
a rule, but as a judicial interference by the legislative department;
with an act and a subject properly falling within the scope of the
powers of the judicial department, yet, under the circumstances,
it might be deemed most correct in him to leave the matter to be
disposed of by the Court of Appeals. For the final decision of
which tribunal see Dugan v. The City of Baltimore, 5 G. & J. 357.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
49 v.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
