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372 THE WHARF CASE,
wharves; (k) yet even that small duty, which might have been
considered as a toll paid only for the use of the port itself, was
held to fall within the scope of those constitutional provisions, and
not allowable without the consent of Congress, which was given
to that act of Assembly by Congress. (I) And which consent has
been, from time to time, renewed since, as it has been found expe-
dient or necessary to raise a fund, in that way, for clearing the
port and repairing the public wharves, (m) And so, too, as a
means of regulating commerce and preventing, preparing for, or
of adding to the energies of war, the federal government has the
power to lay an embargo; and thus, for a season, partially to in-
terrupt the use of all wharves, by closing the public ports alto-
gether against all foreign intercourse, (n)
Those public rights within a port which are involved in the ex-
clusive internal government of the Republic, in all cases fall within
the range of the powers of the state government; yet if the port
itself be not within the body of a county; but, as an arm of the
sea, be within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, then, as to acts
committed in it; and as to all acts in any port which come within
the jurisdiction of the admiralty, the tribunals of the state can
take no cognizance of them; because the judicial power of the
United States is extended to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, (o) But in all cases where the tribunals of the states
have an exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, the state government
may make and enforce all needful regulations for the purpose of
giving a salutary system of police to the port itself, and its town,
especially in so far as it may be within the body of a county, as
is the fact of the port of Baltimore, (p)
Private rights in a public port may be of various kinds; but all
of them are subject to those public rights, the regulation of which
have been left either with the state, or delegated to the federal
department of the government of our Republic. Any individual
holder of the shore of a navigable river or haven may use it for
the purpose of landing his own goods which are not chargeable
with any duty; or he may suffer another to do so, upon any terms
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(k) April, 1763, ch. 24, s. 10; Hale de Portibus, 78, 87; Mayor of Yarmouth v.
Eaton, 3 Burr, 1402; Casher v. Holmes, 22 Com. Law Hep, 146.—(l) Acts Cong.
11 Aug. 1790, ch. 43.~(m) 1791, ch. 60; Acts Cong. 12 May, 1796, ch. 26.—(n)
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 191.—(o) The United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 337;
Hastings v. Plater, 1 Bind. 613 note.~(p) 1734, ch, 16; 1758, ch. 27; March,
1774 ch. 18; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203.
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