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THE WHARF CASE, 371
It is obvious, however, that the legal establishment and regula-
tion of all ports, to the extent to which the regulation of marine
commerce, and the collection of revenue from it, have been dele-
gated to the government of the Union, must necessarily fall within
the scope of its authority, as incident to those powers; for, with-
out the power to confine such trade to certain specified ports it
would be difficult or impossible to collect duties on the tonnage
of ships or the importation of merchandise. Upon these princi-
ples, therefore, all the public ports of the United States, since the
establishment of the federal government, have been described, and,
in a great measure, regulated, as such, under its authority, (i)
In all public ports there are three kinds of rights, the distinct
nature of which, owing to the peculiar form of our government, it
becomes more necessary to attend to here than in England. There
are, first, public rights, affecting commerce in general, or those in
relation to war and foreign intercourse; secondly, public rights in-
volving the powers of the internal government of the Republic;
and lastly, private rights, such as the ownership of the soil, or any
peculiar franchise,
It is declared by the federal constitution, that 'no preference
shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the
ports of one state over those of another;' that 'no state shall,
without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws;' and that 'no state shall, without
the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage.' (j)
These rules being fundamental cannot be evaded in any manner
whatever; no preference can be given by requiring the payment of
tolls or wharfage of any ships or goods, coming from other states
of the Union, not demandable on those of this state; nor can
duties or tonnage of any kind be exacted of ships or goods
coining into our ports from any other of the United States, or
from any foreign country, without the consent of Congress. And
although it had been found expedient to collect in the port of Bal-
timore, and in many others of the ports of this Union, as in Eng-
land, a small duty of tonnage, or port duty, to be appropriated to
the sole purpose of clearing the port itself of all obstructions, and
keeping it in good navigable order, and for repairing the public
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(t) Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 193; Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh
Company, 2 Peters, 245.—(j) Const U. S., art. 1, s. 9 and 10.
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