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THE WHARF CASE. 367
by them in their answers to the two previous bills against them;
and they stated, that they had, by an ordinance of the 3d of April,
1825, established a rate of tonnage duties demandable of all ves-
sels for lying at any of the public wharves, which they had col-
lected accordingly until hindered and prevented by the defendant,
who had, under a pretended right that those duties belonged to
him, proceeded to enforce the payment thereof from sundry mas-
ters of vessels to a very large amount of money. Whereupon
they prayed for an injunction; that a receiver might be appointed
and for general relief. This bill was certified under the seal of
the corporation to be true; and was also sworn to by the harbour-
master of the city.
1st March, 1830.—BLAND, Chancellor.—Ordered, that the
register issue writs of subpoena and injunction as prayed by the
foregoing bill of complaint. And it is further Ordered, that the
harbour-master, or other officer, who now is, or hereafter may be
appointed by the said plaintiffs to collect the wharfage or tonnage
on their behalf on the west side of the said canal or dock in the
said bill mentioned, be and he is hereby authorized and directed
to continue to collect, receive, account for, and pay over the same
according to the directions, authority, and power vested in him by
the said plaintiffs. And he is hereby directed and required to
make out and keep a separate and distinct account of the moneys
so collected and received by him; and to make return thereof to
this court on oath when required, to the end, that the same may
be retained or paid according as the right thereto shall be made to
appear, (a) ______________
To this bill the defendant put in his answer, on the 17th of
July, 1830, in which he admitted all that was set forth in relation
to the formation of the wharves, the passing of the ordinances;
and the plaintiffs pretending to have a well-founded claim; but
he denied the right of the plaintiffs to make such collections;
and averred, that their doing so was in violation of his previously
vested rights; that he, as the owner of a lot of ground, binding
on the tide-water, and on Market space, had legally extended the
fast land of his lot, along Market space into the water by filling it
up as far as the line established by the port wardens; and thereby
had acquired a complete legal title to the land thus gained from
(a) Palmer v. Vaughan, 3 Swan. 173.
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