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COOMBS v. JORDAN. 810
Their liability is spoken of as the then established law. It is not
said in general terms, that as against those holding such equitable
interests, their creditors were in all cases without remedy; but
'that the creditors of such persons are often without remedy either
at law or in equity.'
After the passage of these laws, it was held, in June, 1800, by
the Court of Appeals, that an equitable interest in real estate was
liable, at the suit of a creditor, to attachment, condemnation and
sale, for the satisfaction of a debt due by its owner, (y) The
court is not reported to have given any reasons for their judgment;
but the decision was considered at that time, as having established
the general rule of law, that all equitable interests might be taken
in execution under a fieri facias as well as by an attachment. In
October of the same year the Chancellor declared, that he so un-
derstood it, and says, that 'he cannot otherwise than remark, that
the decision appears, from transactions in this court, and in the
Land Office, agreeable to the opinion of the late Chancellor
ROGERS, as well as of the present Chancellor;' that is, during
the time of the first Chancellor of the Republic, (z) And in the
year 1821, these general principles seem to have been again
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, (a)
But whatever doubts may have been entertained, as to the exis-
tence of the general rule, they have been entirely removed by the
act which declares, that any equitable estate or interest which a
defendant named in a writ of fieri facias may have in any lands,
tenements or hereditaments, may be taken, seized and sold by vir-
tue of such writ, and the purchaser shall have such title assigned
to him, and in all respects stand in the place of the person whose
title he has purchased, (b) Whether this act shall be considered
as having merely affirmed a pre-existing general rule, or as having
itself introduced and established a new regulation upon the sub-
ject, there yet will remain some difficulty to be removed.
It seems to be agreed even upon English principles, that a
judgment is not a lien upon a mere empty legal estate, and that
it cannot be extended under an elegit; (e) while on the other hand
it must be admitted, that where the whole equitable interest is in
the defendant leaving nothing more than a mere empty legal title
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(y) Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535; Pratt v. Law, 9 Cran. 456, 495;
Campbell v. Pratt, S Wheat 429.—(2) Hopkins v. Stomp, 2 H. & J. 302.—(a) Ford
v. Philpot, 5 H. & J, 312.—(6) 1810, ch. 160.—(e) Powel Mortg. 274, note.
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