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COOMBS v. JORDAN. 315
Upon these principles the writ of fieri facias was framed, and in
concise and general terms expressed the nature and extent of the
sheriff's power and duty. The language of the execution imports,
that the goods and chattels, which are the subject of it, are pro-
perty of a tangible nature, capable of manual seizure, and of being
detained in the sheriff's custody, and such as are conveniently
capable of sale and transfer by the sheriff", to whom the writ is di-
rected, for the satisfaction of a creditor. The legal interest in a
term for years, both in respect to the possession of which the lease-
hold property itself is capable; and also in respect of the instru-
ment by which the term is created and secured, both of which are
capable of delivery to a vendee, has been always held to answer
the description of the writ, and to be saleable thereunder. So the
terms of the writ embraced all the present profits of the debtor's
lands; and, consequently, any crop, although it then grew upon
and was considered as a part of the land itself, might be cut,
gathered and sold. A rent service, or rent charge, both of which
are regarded as realty; and a reversion, after a particular estate
then in existence, and any estate for life; or the interest which a
husband holds, jure uxoris, during coverture might, under the sta-
tute of 1285, be extended by elegit; and therefore a lien attached
upon all such freehold interests from the date of the judgment, (f)
That the stock of a turnpike company, or of a canal company,
must, upon common law principles, be considered as real estate is
sufficiently clear; but whether such stock may be extended as
such under an elegit, or may be sold under a fieri facias, is not so
certain. In England such stock is commonly declared to be real
estate by the act of incorporation itself; (g) but here it has, in
several instances, been declared to be personal property. It would
seem, that even considered as realty, no lien would attach on ob-
taining a judgment against the holder unless it could be shewn,
that it might be taken in execution; but for that I have met with
no authority. If on the other hand such stock should be consi-
dered as personalty, then it is clear, even Opposing it could be
taken in execution, that no lien would arise from the judgment
but merely from the execution, (h) It is, however, certain, that
(f) 2 Inst. 394; Underbill v. Devereux, 2 Saund. 69; Arbuckle v. Cowtan, 3
Bos. & Pall. 322; Scott v. Scholey, 8 East. 407; Gilb. Execu. 30; Powel Mortg.
255, note K, 599, note W.—(g) Powel Mortg. 24, note.—(h) Shaw v. Wright, 3 Ves,
22; Knapp v. Williams, 4 Ves. 430, note. It has been since provided by the act of
1832, ch. 307, that under a fieri facias, or attachment, any interest which the defendant
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