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COOMBS v. JORDAN 309
expressions it would seem, and it has been so understood by some
here, that land might be taken in execution by process emanating
from any court whatever; as well from the lowest as from the
highest, and as well from a court of record as from one not of re-
cord. If so, there can be no doubt that lands might be taken and
sold by virtue of an execution issuing upon a judgment rendered
by a justice of the peace, (r)
But this statute of 1732, points to another analogy which casts
much light upon this subject; it declares, that lands shall be assets
in like manner as real estates are by the law of England liable to
the satisfaction of debts due by bond. Now it is clear, as has
been shewn, that lands, in England, can only be made liable as
assets for the satisfaction of such debts by a suit in a common law
court of record, or in a Court of Chancery. Whence it may be
strongly inferred, that as land cannot be taken in execution under
any process emanating from a court not of record in England, it
cannot be sold by virtue of an execution upon a judgment ren-
dered by a justice of the peace here, whose jurisdiction, in regard
to small debts, cannot, in any respect, be considered as that of a
court of record. And besides, where lands are sold under a fieri
facias, it is necessary that the execution should be returned in
order that there may be written and recorded evidence of the title
so conveyed; but, although an execution from a justice of the
peace may be returned, there is no law authorizing it to be re-
corded, and recognized as evidence of that grade and for that
purpose, (s)
This statute of 1732, provides, that houses, lands and other
hereditaments and real estate, shall be chargeable with all just
debts; and then proceeds to declare, that they shall be assets for
the satisfaction thereof in like manner as real estates are by the
law of England liable to the satisfaction of debts due by bond.
This latter specification of the manner of the liability, has been
considered as an indication of the kind of the real estate intended
to be embraced by it; and taking this as the criterion by which to
ascertain how far any interest in lands or real estate of any de-
scription should be considered as having been subjected to the
payment of debts by this statute, it has been applied, certainly to
(r) West v. Hughes, 1 H. St J. 6; 1799, ch. 86; 1801 ch. 41, s. 2.—(t) l1809, ch.
76,s.4; 1814, ch. 82; Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland, 590. This matter has been since
disposed of by the act of 1881,ch. Den. v George, Taylor's Rep, 22.
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