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WILLIAMS' CASE. 275
having been made, we conceive it would be unsafe to adopt them.
In ascertaining the value of this legacy at the time of its purchase,
we apprehend, there would be a much better chance of justice
being effected by applying by analogy the rule adopted, long
since, in the Court of Chancery, for the purpose of ascertaining
the allowance to a woman, in lieu of her dower in land sold under
a decree of that court, .Mrs. Dorsey is shewn to have been about
forty years of age at the date of the purchase, and the calculation
should be made in conformity with the above rule. By such cal-
culation the legacy was worth the sum of $761 90. With this
value the appellants should be credited on the day of the purchase
of the legacy.' (y)
The manifest discordances of the rules which have been laid
down, or adopted for the government of this court, in cases of this
kind, require some further remarks. The legislative rule, in regard
to dower, which directs that, in certain specified cases, not more
than one-seventh nor less than a tenth of the net proceeds of the
sale of the whole estate, shall be awarded to the widow in lieu of
her dower, fixes an arbitrary limitation, the reason of which is not
apparent. As early marriages in our country are common, there
must be many instances of young widows; and consequently, this
legislative rule must embrace all cases of widowhood from fifteen
to eighty years of age; with an expectation of life, according to
Finlaison's tables, ranging from forty-seven to no more than six
years; and yet, bound by this rule, the court can, on the one
hand, award to the life of forty-seven years expectation no more
than a seventh; and on the other must give to the life of only six
years expectation, not less than one-tenth of the whole net pro-
ceeds of sale. This rule thus appears from itself to be in many
of its bearings unreasonable and unjust
In all inquiries as to the present value of a life interest in real
estate, it is indispensably necessary to bear in mind the distinction
between the interest of the particular tenant, and that of him in
remainder or reversion; and also to take especial care, that neither
should have awarded to him any thing which may properly be
considered a part of the value of the estate which belongs to the
other. Thus, supposing the whole estate were sold for f 9,000;
that sum would represent the entire value of the whole, including
both interests, as well that of the tenant in dower, who was enti-
(y) Dorsey v. Smith, T H. & 1. 366.
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