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WALSH v. SMITH. 27
notice to those purchasers; and they being no way concerned with
this matter in controversy, farther than as they voluntarily involved
themselves in its consequences, by purchasing the lands which
were so bound, they can have no right to come in as parties, or to
have a rehearing of the case. If the lands which they purchased
had been the immediate subject of controversy in this suit, pending
which they had purchased, then that lis pendens would clearly have
been such a notice to all such purchasers as effectually to bind them
to abide by the event of the suit, without having the privilege of
being admitted as parties to it in any manner whatever, (s) But
those purchasers of the realty do not complain; and even if they
did, the personal representative of Casenave cannot be allowed to
come here as the bearer of their complaints; and there is no heir
or devisee to whom Casenave's real estate passed on his death,
asking to be let in as parties, or to have this decree rescinded and
the case reheard, for the protection of their interests or of those of
any one who claims under their ancestor or devisor. This decree
therefore cannot be disturbed for any such purpose.
The petitioner alleges, that if permitted to come in as a co-plain-
tiff, he could and would obtain sufficient proof to establish the
matters set forth in the bill. He does not pretend to have dis-
covered any testimony which was not known to him in time to
hare had it produced and used at the hearing of the case; nor
does he in any manner account for the very great negligence of
Casenave, or of his administrator Walker, or of those who must
have had a legal and beneficial object in sustaining Casenave's
interests, if any he had after the death of Walker, he never having
attempted to come in and bring before the court, that sufficient and
competent testimony which he now says he believes may be
obtained for that purpose.
If such general and loose allegations as these were to be deemed
sufficient ground to open a decree and to grant a rehearing of the
case, there would be no end to litigation. It is a most incumbent
duty of the court, to take care that the same subject should not be
put in a course of repeated litigation, and with that view, to require
of parties reasonably active diligence in the first instance, (t) If the
representative of Casenave, or those by whom it was fit to have his
interests taken care of after his death, had used any ordinary dili-
(t) The Mechanics Bank of Alexandria r. Seton, 1 Peters, 299.—(t) Young v.
Keighly, 16 Ves, 351.
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