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240 WILLIAMS' CASE.
A case which was determined, after much deliberation, about
the year 1750, appears to have been the first in which any allusion
was made, in the courts of Westminster Hall, to the mode adopted
by eminent mathematicians for ascertaining the present value of a
life interest of any kind; (6) which mode, however, after that time
seems to have been well understood; and has been often referred
to in those courts, (e) It would seem, that so early as 1759, the
arbitrary rule of considering an estate for life in land, as equivalent
in value to one-third of the whole, was not implicitly followed, (d)
In 1785, the rule was put aside as unjust; and each interest di-
rected to be valued according to its actual worth, and in due pro-
portion, (e) In the year 1787, it appears, that among other kinds
of evidence, tables shewing the expectation of life were resorted
to as a means of ascertaining the value of a life interest; (f) and
it was declared, that the division which the court had formerly
made of a burthen upon the whole, of one-third to the tenant for
life, had been found to be arithmetically wrong, though the princi-
ple, that it should be borne in proportion, was right, (g) In the
year 1798, this matter having been again submitted for considera-
tion, the old rule was entirely exploded; and it was declared, that
the doctrine of charging one-third upon the tenant for life could
not hold, and was not to be applied in any case. That it was a
most unreasonable and absurd rule; for, it being admitted, that
every person should contribute according to his interest, a man of
the age of eighty, with, perhaps, not a year to live, must be said
to have as much interest as one of twenty. (A)
The matter, it is said, had, in some of the cases determined
prior to the year 1804, been very anxiously, frequently and gravely
considered, although it does not appear from the reports of them;
because of the intricacy of the subject, and of its not being easy
to follow a discussion upon so difficult a question in which such
great nicety of fact and calculation were involved. And it was
then finally laid down, as a general rule in all cases, where a pre-
sent value was to be put upon an annuity for life, or any other life
interest in property, as well as where a burthen was to be borne
by an entire estate which was held by a particular tenant, and a
(b) Chesterfield 0. Janssen, 2 Ves. 127.—(c) Nichols v. Gould, 2 Yes. 423.--(d)
Lawrence v. Maggs, 1 Eden, 453; Picketing v. Vowles, 1 Bro. C. C. 198.—(f)
Nightingale v. Lawson, 1 Bro. C. C. 440; S. C. 1 Cox, 181.—(f) Heathcote v.
Paignon, 2 Bro. C. C, 167; Griffith v. Spratley, 1 Cox, 389.—(g) Stone v. Theed, 3
Bro, C. C, 243,—(A) White v. White, 4 Ves. 24; Penryn v, Hughes, 5 Ves. 107.
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