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WILLIAMS' CASE. 223
versioner. (f) In 1696, it was again, in each of two distinct
cases, laid down, that on a bill to redeem, the tenant for life must
pay one-third, and the reversioner two-thirds of the mortgage
debt, (g) In 1710, on a bill by a remainderman to compel the
tenant for life of a lease for years to have it renewed, it was held,
that the tenant for life should pay one-third of the expense of re-
newment, and the remainderman the residue, (h) In 1718, on a
bill brought by creditors, it appeared, that the deceased debtor
bad, on his marriage, covenanted to settle lands that should be of
the value of sixty pounds per annum, upon his wife for life, which
he had failed to do. Upon which it was held, that the wife should
come in only as a specialty creditor; and in order to settle the
quantum of her demand, an estimate was directed to be made of
the value of her estate for life, at so many years purchase, upon
which she was to be let in as a specialty creditor for so much
money, (i) And in 1750, a similar question having arisen, it was
determined, that the tenant for life should pay one-third of the fine
and charges of renewing a lease, and that the two-thirds should
be paid by the remainderman, (j)
No explanation is to be found in any of these cases of the prin-
ciples of equity upon which the court proceeded in fixing the pro-
portion in which the tenant for life and the reversioner should con-
tribute; nor is the age or health of the tenant for life, spoken of
in any of them. It does not, however, seem to have been adopted
as an absolute rule, but rather as one of convenience; as a medium
by which to apply the rule of equity; for, in a case of this kind,
determined in 1697, it is said, that in adjusting what each estate
was to pay, each was to be valued at what they were respectively
worth to be sold, (k) In the first of the before recited cases, it is,
in general terms, asserted to be most just; yet it is fair to pre-
sume, that Hannah at the time of the death of her second husband,
when her life estate was estimated as being equal to one-third of
the whole, must have been far advanced in life. The proportions
fixed by the case decided in 1692, seems to have been considered
in 1720, as a departure from the general rule, (l) In one of the
cases decided in 1696, it was said, that the rule seemed hard, be-
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(f) James v. Hales, 2 Vern. 267; S. C. Prec. Cha. 44.—(g) Ballet v. Sprainger,
Prec. Cha. 62; Flud v. Flud, 2 Freem. 210.—(4) Lock v. Lock, 2 Vern, 666.—
(i) Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Will. 429,—(j) Verney v. Verney, 1 Ves. 428.—
(k) Heveningham v. Heveningham, 2 Vern. 355.—(l) Anonymous, 1 P. Will. 650.
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