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WILLIAMS' CASE. 205
benefit as to prevent such infants from becoming idle paupers and
a burthen to the community; and therefore no law which provides
for the preservation of their property, and the proper application
of their estates to their maintenance and education, can be deemed
an infringement of their rights.
An infant may, apparently, succeed to property which cannot,
in strictness, be said to belong to him, because of the claims of
others. The creditors of the ancestor from whom the estate de-
scended, must be first paid before any part of it can be applied to
the use of the infant heir. An act of Assembly which facilitates
the application of such an estate to the payment of the debts of its
3ate owner, merely gives to it its proper direction; and therefore,
instead of violating, affirms the right to it, as deduced from its de-
ceased owner. Nor can any law which goes no further than to
provide for the application of an infant's estate to his maintenance
and education, be regarded as, in any respect, a violation of such
infant's right of property. An infant is, in general, incompetent to
contract; but he may, by contract, bind himself for his mainte-
nance and education; and hence a legislative enactment, which
facilitates such an application of his estate, co-operates with the
infant's legally qualified right to contract, in discharge of a duly
to himself, without trenching upon any of his rights.
The several tribunals of the judicial department of our govern-
ment, have been framed and established with a view to the deter-
mination of matters in controversy between individuals. The
Orphans Courts have been entrusted with authority to appoint
guardians for infants; and to see that such guardians perform their
duty as prescribed by law; and the Court of Chancery has been
invested with a similar and more extensive power in regard to the
care of infants and their estates, (p) But neither of those courts,
nor any other of the tribunals of the republic have been, or can
constitutionally be clothed with a discretionary power to sell and
dispose of the property of any one, infant or adult, merely for his
own interest and advantage, apart from the maintenance and edu-
cation of such infant owner. Such a power is not judicial in its
nature; and therefore, cannot be conferred upon or exercised by
any branch of the judicial department.
To coerce the payment of debts, and to make sale of property
for that purpose; or to provide for, and enforce the application of
(p) Corrie's case, 2 Bland, 489
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