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SALMON v. CLAGETT. 175
tion would be rendered more precarious, and they would thereby
become more likely to be damnified.
If that was the intention of these sureties, they certainly have
not so distinctly expressed themselves by this mortgage. That
deed evidently purports to be a continuing guaranty, not merely
until the sureties should think proper to put an end to it, by giving
notice to Salmon, that it should be no longer continued; but its
duration forms an express part of the contract itself; it was to en-
dure until the 1st of October, 1830, and no longer. And it was
not to exceed in amount the sum of $10,000; thus limiting the
extent of the liability of the sureties without making the slightest
allusion to the extent of the credit which Thomas Clagett might
obtain from Salmon or any one else; or to the scope of his busi-
ness; or to the perils and risks in which he might be involved by
the wide range of his commercial concerns. The sense and
substance of this mortgage, considered as a guaranty, comes to
this, that these sureties thereby undertake to sustain the credit of
Thomas Clagett to an amount not exceeding $ 10,000, continually
from that time until the 1st of October, 1830. It is, therefore, of
no importance as regards this mortgage, what may be the amount
of the debt due from Thomas Clagett to Salmon beyond that sum;
since the mortgage covers no more than $10,000; nor is it of any
consequence when, within the specified period of time, the credit
was given by Salmon to Thomas Clagett, so it was given in the
manner described in the deed. The proofs clearly establish the
fact, that the liability from Thomas Clagett to Salmon was incurred
in the mode specified by the deed; therefore, I am of opinion,
that there is no foundation for this objection, (q)
It has also been insisted, that the credit has been extended, and
the time of payment enlarged, by the agreement of the 26th of
May, 1828, Whether that can be so considered must depend
upon what shall be deemed the true meaning of the mortgage.
I take the sense of that contract to be, that Salmon, upon the
faith of the property so pledged to him, agreed to lend his credit
to Thomas Clagett during a certain time, and to a specified amount.
The sole object of that deed was to obtain for Thomas Clagett such
a credit; but if the mortgage might have been foreclosed, at any
time, to enforce payment for any parcel of goods sold; and of
every sum of money lent by Salmon to Thomas Clagett, as it be-
(q) Lanusse v. Barker, 3 Wheat. 148; Mason v. Pritchard, 12 East. 227.
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