|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SALMON v. CLAGETT, 169
because the grantor, as administratrix, had no power to make such
a deed, I understand the defendants as making no such objection
to it, as a conveyance of the really therein mentioned; and as also
assuming the ground, that unless it can avail the plaintiff as a deed
proceeding from the administratrix, who alone, among the grantors,
had the power thus to sell, or pledge the personalty, it must fail as
to that altogether. I shall, therefore, as regards this position,
consider this deed as embracing nothing more than the property
therein specified as the assets which Elizabeth Clagett held as the
administratrix of William Clagett, deceased.
An executor or administrator is, in equity, regarded as a trustee;
but then, in equity, as well as at law, an administrator is consi-
dered, in general, as the absolute owner of the assets of the
deceased, whether they be legal or equitable, or choses in action.
The exercise of the powers of unqualified ownership to a certain
extent is indispensably necessary to enable him to execute his
trust, and to discharge his duty to advantage, and also to prevent
the general inconvenience of implicating and entangling third per-
sons in inquiries as to the application he may propose to make of
the money produced by the conversion of the assets. A fair pur-
chaser for a valuable consideration is, in no way, bound to see
to the application of the purchase money by an executor. He can-
not have the means of knowing the debts of the deceased; and
is, therefore, absolved from all inquiry respecting them. Upon
these general principles, not even a creditor of the deceased is per-
mitted to follow the assets so aliened; for the demand of a credi-
tor is only a personal demand against the executor in respect of
the assets come to his hands, but no lien on the assets. And a
specific or residuary legatee can stand upon no higher ground, in
this respect, than a creditor, (k)
The only qualification of this general rule is, where the transac-
tion is, in some way, tainted by fraud. Every person who ac-
quires personal assets by a breach of trust, or devastavit in the
executor or administrator is responsible to those entitled under the
will, or as creditors, or next of kin, if he be a party to the breach
of trust What will amount to a fraud of this kind must depend
upon the circumstances of the case. It is said, that generally
speaking, he does not become a party to the breach of trust by
(k) Nugent v. Gifford, 1 Atk, 463; McLeod v. Drummond, 14 Ves. 359; S. C.
17 Ves.153; Keane v. Robarts, 4 Mad. 357; Power Morg. 136, note,
22 v.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
