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SALMON v. CLAGETT. 165
injunction was granted, and no further. And the confidence it
had reposed in the bill will not be shaken, unless it is fully
answered, and its truth, is, in point of fact, materially denied.
An answer should always be sworn to by the respondent; for it
is only the answer of him who swears to it, although it may pur-
port to be the answer of others. The statement or denial of facts
within the defendant's own knowledge should be made distinctly
and positively; or, at least, as much so as his recollection will
admit. But if the defendant be charged in a representative charac-
ter, such as that of an executor, he may answer on his belief, and
shew such pregnant circumstances as the foundation of that belief
as to induce the court to adopt and act upon it (e)
It is no objection to the validity and efficacy of an answer, in
this respect, that the defendant is infamous, or a negro; and, as
such, an incompetent witness in ordinary cases; his answer must,
notwithstanding, have full credit allowed to it; since the plaintiff,
by calling him into court, has given him a competency to this
extent for the purpose of defending himself and protecting his
property; (f) if it were otherwise, in all cases, where a bill or
answer is required, by the rules of the court, to be verified by an
affidavit of the party himself, as he would be incapable of comply-
ing with the rule, he would be denied the benefit of justice, and,
in effect, placed in a condition little better than an outlaw, (g)
Upon similar principles, I have held, that where a corporation
aggregate alone was the defendant, its answer, under seal, was
admitted and credited as if made on oath; because it could not
answer in any other way; and the plaintiff by so calling for its
answer, had tacitly admitted its sufficiency; and because without
its being allowed all the effect of an answer on oath the corpora-
tion could not protect its property, (h) The facts stated in the
bill, and those responsive thereto, as set forth in the answer, are
poised against each other; and so far as they are contradictory,
those of the answer, being always allowed to preponderate, the
injunction is dissolved or continued accordingly, (i)
Carrying with us these principles and rules to the consideration
of the answers of these defendants, and it will be seen, that they
(e) Jones v. Magill, 1 Bland, 177.—(f) Davis & Carter's case, 2 Salk, 461; S. C.
5 Mod. 74; Omychund 9. Barker, 1 Atk. 50; Wilson v. Polk, a free negro, 6 No-
vember, 1826, M. S.; 1717, ch. 13, s. 2.—(g) Bowyer v. McEvoy, 1 Ball & Bea.
562.—(k) Bayard v. The Chesapeake & Delaware Company, 18 October, 1828,
M. S,—(i) Gibson v. Tilton, 1 Bland, 355.
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