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SALMON v. CLAGETT. 189
been denied by a demurrer, or a plea; but taken in another point
of view, they have expressly admitted, or Hot denied the facts of
the case out of which the plaintiff's equity arises. The facts of a
plaintiff's case on which his injunction rests, may be materially
different from those of his whole case on which he founds his
claim to relief, (d)
Hence an answer may have denied all the facts on which the in-
junction rests, and yet be entirely insufficient in all other respects.
But, may an injunction be dissolved on the coming in of an an-
swer which is, in this respect, insufficient ? If it can, then it will
be enough for the court, on a motion to dissolve, to direct its
attention chiefly or exclusively to so much of the bill and answer
as speaks of the facts on which the injunction rests. But suppose
the rule to be otherwise; and, that it requires the answer to be in
all respects unexceptionable, then, upon a motion to dissolve, the
court ought not to confine itself altogether to the consideration of
those facts which produce the equity on which the injunction rests,
but must comprehend the whole case as laid before it by the bill
and answer; so far as the answer is, or ought to be responsive to
the bill. There is yet a third aspect in which this subject may be
viewed. An answer may be in all respects unexceptionable; and
admitting all the facts stated in the bill, it may positively deny all
its equity, in the sense of a denial by a plea; by shewing matter
in avoidance; which if taken for true will operate as a bar. Is
the court, on a motion to dissolve, to take the answer for true as
to matter in avoidance; as well as in regard to allegations respon-
sive to the bill? If it must, then the question will be; how
stands the equity, taking the whole case represented by the defen-
dant, as opposed to that shewn by the plaintiff?
These are important distinctions as regards a motion to dis-
solve; since it is perfectly clear, that, in almost every case, the
result would vary according as the one or the other of these three
modes of considering the subject should be adopted.
In England there appears to be several modes of obtaining and
dissolving an injunction; and each of them seems to differ in
some particulars from that pursued in this state.
After an injunction has been granted before answer, it is said,
that, according to the English course of proceeding, the defendant
x&ay obtain an order to have the injunction dissolved on the
(d) Hurst v. Thomas, 2 Anst 585, 591; Doe v. Roe, 1 Hopk. Rep. 276.
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