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SALMON v. CLAGETT. l57
upon a great variety of facts, which is an unnecessary vexatious
burthen thrown upon him. (z)
If the late cases, it is said, as far as they are authorities, (a)
intimating by that turn of expression a doubt, whether they ought
to be really so considered, have established these exceptions to this
rule; then it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence,
that the negation, or new matter relied on in the answer, to pro-
tect the defendant from discovery, must, at least, be brought for-
ward by the answer as distinctly as if it had been pleaded. (6)
And also, that all the facts stated in the bill, not covered by this
form of defence, should, as in the case of a plea, be admitted to
enable the plaintiff, at the hearing, to obtain a final decree for so
much as was admitted, and sustained in opposition to the defence
set up; in case a further discovery might not be necessary. But,
as to all these matters, the new mode of proceeding is enveloped in
darkness and uncertainty. Apparently aware of the difficulties
into which the plaintiff would be thrown, in case the defendant
should fail to sustain his defence in this form; it is said in one of
those cases, that if such matter should be found against the defen-
dant, he may be examined upon interrogatories to discover his
knowledge, (e) But what weight is to be given to the answers to
those interrogatories; and to what points are they to be directed ?
A plea places the case, and its several parts, in a clear, definitive
condition; but this new fashioned defence distinctly specifies
nothing.
After passing over this review of the subject, and considering
how the law is chained together, and how important it is to pre-
serve its consistency and harmony as a whole, and in its several
parts; and that the genius of all our institutions requires, that no
excrescences should be allowed to fasten upon and mar their sim-
plicity; or retard their operations, and impose any unnecessary
burthen upon a citizen who desires to obtain the benefit of them,
it does seem to me, that this new course of proceeding can hare
no claim to the favourable consideration of this court. Besides,
the Court of Chancery of Maryland is a judicial structure as little
complicated as an institution of the kind can well be made. It is
lumbered up with no useless officers; and its forms of proceeding
have been almost entirely divested of every thing which would in
(z) Shaw v. Ching, 11 Ves. 805; Somerville v. Mackay, 16 Ves. 387,—(a) Dol-
der v. Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 293.~-(b) Faulder v. Stuart, 11 Ves. 302.—(c) Randal
v. Head, Hard. 188.
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