|
|
|
|
|
150 SALMON v. CLAGETT
point to be tried; and if that be denied, and shewn to be untrue,
his whole case is broken up, his destroyed; and therefore, he
cannot have the discovery and account he calls for, A plea which
denies the fact of partnership, in such case, is called a negative
plea; and it will protect the defendant from the discovery or ac-
count; the right to call for which having been founded upon that
which is denied.
Upon a like ground, where a defendant, in his answer, posi-
tively denies the fact of partnership, his answer, it is said, must be
deemed sufficient; and consequently, that he cannot be compelled
to go on and discover and account as required by the bill. This
denial in the answer, it is obvious, in this respect, performs the
office of a negative plea. It is one of the alleged exceptions to
the general rule, that a defendant who submits to answer shall
answer fully as the bill requires. This, and all similar negations
in answers may be called negative exceptions.
Where a defendant, admitting all the facts in the bill to be true,
advances and affirms other facts not mentioned in the bill, in the
shape of a plea, as an avoidance and bar of the whole claim of the
plaintiff; such a plea affords to the defendant a protection from the
discovery sought by the bill. As where the plaintiff sets out his
right to an estate, and prays a discovery of some particulars re-
specting the title, and the defendant, by plea, avers, that he is a
bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, he
will be protected by such plea from the required discovery. In
like manner, if the defendant, by his answer, avers, that he is such
a purchaser; it is said, that such matter, so alleged, in his answer,
must be deemed a sufficient answer; and allowed to protect him
from the discovery called for. This is another of the alleged ex-
ceptions to the general rule. It is evidently founded on an aver-
ment of a new fact, in avoidance, which might have been made
the subject of a plea; and gives a protection from discovery in
like manner as such a plea would have done; therefore, this,
and others of a similar nature, may be denominated affirmative
exceptions.
There are various instances in which a defendant has been allowed
Ho tike shelter from the discovery sought of him by denying the
title or some material fact constituting the title of the plaintiff. A
denial of the whole demand has been held to be a sufficient answer,
and one which affords protection against the discovery required, (b)
(b) Phelips v. Caney, 4 Ves, 107.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|