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SALMON v. CLAGETT. 145
proceedings, or be shewn, that the answer would criminate, or
subject him to a forfeiture, he cannot be compelled to give it; and
this privilege extends not only to the broad and leading feet; but
to any fact which may furnish a step in the prosecution; and is
likewise so applied as to protect a husband or wife from being com-
pelled so to answer as to criminate the other, (i) And although
one may avail himself of this privilege, when he can safely do so,
by demurrer, or plea; (j) yet he is under no obligation to take
that course, for it may be, that he could not demur; because, that
might be to admit the facts to be true, (k) But the claiming of
this privilege never creates a defence against relief in this court;
therefore, as in case of usury, or forgery, if proof can be made of
it, the court will let the case go on to a hearing; but will not
force the party, by his own oath, to subject himself to punishment
for it. (l)
Again, if the defendant has obtained his knowledge of the facts,
concerning which the bill requires him to answer, as an attorney,
or solicitor; and, he so avers in his answer, it will be deemed
conclusive and sufficient. The policy of the law has established
it as the privilege of a client, that no facts which he communicates
to his attorney or solicitor as such, shall be disclosed upon any
occasion without his permission. The court, before which an
attorney or solicitor is called, will not suffer him to divulge the
secrets of his client; and therefore, a plaintiff cannot be allowed
to draw forth such communications, either by placing the attorney
in the situation of a mere witness, or of a defendant to his suit, (m)
Again, if the documentary evidence, called for by the bill, be of
a public nature, which the defendant holds as the keeper of such
public records, which are open to all, and exemplifications of
which may be obtained by any one, on paying the legal fees; and
it is not alleged in the bill, that he had hindered any person from
searching, or refused copies on payment of his fees, his answer,
that he doth not know any thing that is prayed in the bill, but as
an officer, will be deemed sufficient, (n)
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(i) Wrottesley v. Bendish, 3 P. Will. 238; Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves. 405;
Claridge v. Hoare, 14 Ves. 59; Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swan. 214; McIntyre 9.
Mancius, 16 John. 592,—(j) Bea. PL Eq. 27S,-~(k) Honeywood u, Selwin, 3 Atk,
276.—(I) Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. 246; Singery e. Attorney-General, 2 H.
& J. 490.—(m) Wright v. Mayer, 6 Ves. 281; Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swan. 194;
Greenough v. Gaskill, 8 Cond, Cha. Hep, 304; Wilson v. Rastall, 4 T. E. 753.—
(n) Delove v. Bellamey, 2 Eq, Ca. Abr. 66.
19 v.3
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