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134 SALMON v. CLAGETT.
constantly recurring to its reason. Ratio est anima legis. (e)
The reason and spirit of cases make law, not the letter of parti-
cular precedents. (f) The law does not consist in particular
eases; bat in general principles which run through the cases and
govern the decision of them, (g) All doubtful points are decided
by an application of general principles to the particular case, (h)
It is the office of an expositor of the law to make such a construc-
tion as not only to reconcile the same author with himself; but
also to remove all apparent jars and conflicts, that may be found
to exist among the various reported judgments upon the same
subject, so that all, if possible, may stand together, (i) It is also
necessary constantly to bear in mind, that the names of things are
for avoiding of confusion diligently to be observed. Nomina si
nescis, perit cognitio rerum. Et nomina si perdas, certe destinctio
rerum perditur, (j) A confusion of terms in any science tends to
confound the science itself, by destroying that precision of ideas,
that distinction amongst objects, which is the very groundwork of
all knowledge. Therefore, without considering the weight of
names, I shall look to the reasons given for the several judgments
it may become necessary for me to notice and examine, (k)
A plaintiff should, in his bill, set forth, in a brief, but clear man-
ner, all the facts and circumstances out of which those principles
of equity arise, upon which he asks relief; or, as I have said,
upon a former occasion, the plaintiff's case, as stated by himself,
must, in substance, or in some essential bearing, have such a
character as will confer jurisdiction on a Court of Chancery; it
must appear to be an equitable, as contradistinguished from a
mere legal cause of suit. The bill must itself shew why it was
necessary, or allowable for the plaintiff to leave the ordinary legal
tribunal and come into a Court of Chancery for relief. (l) For,
the justice of the republic is distributed, by the constitution, into
particular courts, which should not be confounded, (m) The bill
may assert, that such and such principles of equity arise out of the
feels stated, which entitle the plaintiff to relief; but it is for the
court done to determine how far they are applicable or correct.
The case of the plaintiff, then consists merely of facts, ex facto
oritur jus. Consequently the bill calls on the defendant to speak
(e) Co.Litt. 394.—(f) Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr, 1364.—(g) East v. Cooper,
Cowp, 632.~(k) Silk v. Prime, 1 Bro. C. C, 138.—(i) The case of Fines, 3 Co.
84.—(j) Co. Litt 86, b.—(k) Doe p. Lancashire, 5 T. R. 62.—(l) Estep v. Wat-
kins, 1 Bland, 489.—(m) Brown v. Bradshaw, Prec. Cha. 156; 4 Inst. 71.
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