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HEPBURN'S CASE. 109
Upon the first branch of the case I am of opinion, that there is
sufficient evidence to shew that this debt, once due to the estate of
the late John Hepburn, has been long since paid and satisfied by
the Mollisons themselves. And I might here safely rest the case;
but a sense of duty to the state, and a respect for the apparent
sincerity and zeal with which the claim has been pressed by the
petitioner, induce me to proceed with the investigation in relation
to its being barred by the statutory provision, by which it is said
to be embraced, and by the presumption of satisfaction arising
from the great lapse of time.
These terms of opposition are founded on the supposition, that
there is no direct proof that the debt has been fully paid. And in
proceeding upon that supposition, one of three positions must be
taken; first, that no partial payment has been made, in which case
the presumption of payment must begin to run from the first of
April, 1776, when the whole debt became due; or secondly, that
there has been a part payment made of £260, which being in
itself an acknowledgment of the debt on the 12th of January,
1779, when it was made, the estimate of the presumption must
commence from that day; but if, in the last place, as has been
urged, the entry as to the £260 must not be considered as a pay-
ment, then there being no payment but that of the assignments in
the year 1790, the presumption of satisfaction can only rest on the
lapse of time since that period.
It must be recollected, however, that the positive statutory limi-
tation here alluded to, (c) is not like the common statutes for
limitation of actions, which allows the party a certain time to sue,
after his right has accrued, but it specifies the first of September,
1787, as the day, after which no claims of the kind described
therein shall be made against the state; and consequently, if that
limitation embraces this case, this claim, as against the state at
least, has been precluded and barred from that time. From the
nature of this case, this positive limitation, and the presumption
of satisfaction may, with convenience, be considered together, and
I shall, therefore, so consider them.
I have shewn that it must have been the intention of the Gene-
ral Assembly, in referring this case to the Chancellor, that he should
be governed by those substantial principles of equity applicable to
all similar controversies; and that the mere forms of proceeding,
(c) 1786, ch. 18.
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