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198 HEPBURN'S CASE.
help to the executor is made quite manifest, by comparing the
account in his own hand-writing with that in the hand-writing of
the register; from which there can be no doubt, that the register's
draft mast hare been formed from that in Hepburn^ hand-writing,
and also from Hepburn*s explanations and additional information.
According to the register's draft, we have then the entry of the
12th of January, 1779, not only re-affirmed, as to date; but with
this additional information, that it was a payment then made in
continental money; and the register, having been assured by the
executor, that it was so then received, has correctly applied the
scale of depreciation of that year to it; (z) which conclusively
shews, that there could have been no mistake about it as to date.
The register's draft also shews, that the executor could have sus-
tained no loss by the depreciation; because, as he received, so he
paid. But the bill of exchange is shewn to have been drawn and
sold early in 1776; and yet, its existence is not noticed in these
accounts until the 8th of April, 1789; and then, when it is first
brought into view, with all its accumulations of damages and costs,
as a charge against the estate, the register excluded it altogether,
and most justly; because the estate not having profited by the sale
of the bill in 1776, it clearly could not be charged in 1789, with
the amount for which it was drawn, much less with the damages
and costs occasioned by its protest,
Hence the fair and necessary conclusion is, that the negotiation
of this bill of exchange was conducted as a separate concern of
Samuel C. Hepburn^ own; and that it was not, in reality, con-
nected in any way with, or taken into any account which he settled
and passed as executor. According to this view of the subject,
which I am satisfied is the correct one, there is no contradiction or
mystery; all the entries in the accounts, the bill of exchange, and
other circumstances, are perfectly reconciled, and stand well with
each other.
But it is a rule of sound sense, as well as of law, universally
admitted and applicable to all cases, that no one can be allowed to
discredit his own testimony; any more than he can be permitted
to contradict himself, or to deny any of his own solemn admis-
sions. To this rule, it is believed, there is no exception. A party
m&y be allowed to urge, that any principle of law whatever is de-
ducible from the facts he produces, but he can in no case be suf-
(t) May, 1781, ch. 17, s, 2; The Chancellor's ease, 1 Bland, 6g&
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