674 WARING v. WARING.

consideration of the several legislative enactments in relation to the
ages at which females are to be endowed with certain capacities,
it will be seen, that it has been merely declared, that a female
shall be accounted of full age to receive her estate at the age of
eighteen, or day of marriage, which shall first happen; (a) that on
receiving her estate after that age she may execute a release there-
for to her guardian; (b) and that no will shall be good and effec-
tual to pass any interest in land unless the person making the
same, if a female, be of the full age of eighteen years, (e) And
following out those principles upon which a capacity to receive,
hold, and dispose by will of their estates at the age of eighteen,
was conferred upon females, the jurisdiction of the courts, clothed
with the common and ordinary powers in relation to infants, has
been accordingly limited by declaring, that the Orphans Court
should only have authority to appoint a guardian to a female infant
until the age of eighteen, or marriage; and that such guardian
should then account and deliver up all the property in his pos-
session to such female, (d)

But there is nothing in any of those legislative enactments con-
ferring such qualified capacities upon females, or by which the
jurisdiction of the Orphans Courts has been so limited which can
be construed to have altered the general rule of the common law
as to age; or from which females can be construed as of full age
at eighteen in any other respect, or for any other purpose whatever
where the legal capacity has, by the common law, been limited to
the full age of twenty-one years, (e) And since it has been ex-
pressly declared, in immediate connexion with this matter, that
nothing contained in the general act, regulating the powers and
duties of the Orphans Court, should be construed to affect the
general superintending power exercised by the Court of Chancery
with respect to trust; (f) and since it has also been expressly en-
acted, that a sale of the real estate, as prayed for in this instance,
may be decreed in order to save the personal, with the consent of
all parties of full age, and the actual guardian of minors; (g) it
necessarily follows, that this court alone has the power to appoint

(a) 1715, cb. 39, s. 15; 1829, ch. 216, s. 5, 6.—(b) 1829, ch. 216, s. 7. And
since they have been endowed with a capacity to execute powers of attorney for
such purposes, 1831, ch. 805, s. 5.—(e) 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 1, s. 3.—(d) 1798,
ch. 101, sub ch. 12, s. 1 and 15; 1829, ch. 216, s. 5, 6.—(e) Davis v. Jacquin, 5 H.
& J. 100 (f) 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 12, s. 16.-(g) 1818, ch. 193, s. 8; Pue v.
Dorsey, 1 140, note; Partridge v. Dorsey, S H. & J. 305.