ANDREWS v. SCOTTON. 669

Hence, it is clear, that in all cases, either before or after a de-
cree for a sale, if the mortgaged estate should not sell under the
decree, for enough to satisfy the debt, the creditor may prosecute
or institute a suit upon the bond, or any other collateral security,
and recover the balance.

The equitable lien held by the court, as in this instance, is in
the nature of a mortgage; the estate may be sold under it, as
under a decree upon a mortgage; (h) and considered as a security
for the payment of money, it is, to all intents and purposes, a mort-
gage. And there is nothing, according to any fair principle of
analogy, which should forbid the pursuing of any other remedy for
the recovery of a debt, secured by such an equitable lien, any
more than suing on a bond for a debt secured by a mortgage.

In this case, there has been no bond or note given directly for
the payment of the purchase money. The appeal bond was not
given for the payment of the purchase money as such. But, by
the order of the 12th of May, 1826, it was adjudged, that Samuel
Anderson, was in fact, the purchaser, and that he should pay the
amount of the purchase money. From which order, he appealed,
giving bond in the usual terms, to prosecute his appeal with effect;
that is, to have the order reversed, or if it should be affirmed, to
pay the amount so ordered, (i)

The orders of this court, absolutely affirming the sale, and re-
quiring the purchase money to be paid, are substantial parts of that
contract between the court and the purchaser, upon which the
equitable lien rests. The appeal bond is a security, that the order
directing the purchase money to be paid, if affirmed, shall be com-
plied with; consequently, it must be considered as standing in the
same relation to the equitable lien, that a common bond does to a
mortgage, to secure the same debt. They are treated as separate
securities, having for their object, the assurance of the payment of
the same debt; and therefore, the remedy on each may be pursued
at the same time, and prosecuted on both, until an entire satisfac-
tion has been obtained.

But the purchaser, Samuel Anderson, has been taken in execu-
tion, under an attachment, and personally discharged, under the
insolvent laws; (j ) yet, as that cannot operate as a bar to any of

(h) Exparte Hunter, 6 Ves. 94.—(f) Karthaus v. Owings, 6 H. & J. 134; Wood
v. Fulton, 2 H. & G. 72.—( j) 1825, ch. 122, ante 663.
85 V.2