ANDREWS v. SCOTTON. 665

jury may say he is entitled to recover. Hence the electing to
obtain redress by either one of those modes amounts to a waiver
of the other, so that both cannot be prosecuted at the same
time, (v)

In most cases however, the party may resort to all his securities
and have all his remedies put in operation at the same time. As
in the case of a pawn, the right to detain which is not divested by
the pawnee's also taking a covenant or further security on which
he may sue the person of the covenantor. The covenant is con-
sidered as affording, an additional remedy and the party may pro-
ceed on both, (w) So too the holder of a promissory note or bill
of exchange may sue the maker or drawer and each endorser
separately at one and the same time; although he can recover
but one entire satisfaction, (x) And so too under the process of
this court, which is more effectual than that of the common law
tribunals; there may be a sequestration against the goods, although
the party himself is in custody upon an attachment: whereas at
law, if a capias ad satisfaciendum is executed there can no fieri
facias issue, (y)

Where the debt has been secured by a mortgage, a covenant to
repay, and a bond, the creditor may be allowed to pursue all his
remedies at once. He may bring an action of covenant to repay
the money; institute an ejectment against the tenant in posses-
sion; file a bill in equity to foreclose; and also maintain a suit
upon the bond at the same time. But he cannot have the mort-
gaged property awarded to him by a decree of foreclosure, and
also recover the money or any part of it from the debtor by a suit
upon the covenant or bond, (z)

The mortgaged estate is considered as a pledge sufficient for
the satisfaction of the debt; and as having been so taken by the
parties themselves by the nature of their contract. Therefore if
the creditor, on his bill in equity, has a decree to foreclose and
nothing more, he is held to have obtained that kind of satisfaction
of his claim for which he stipulated; and if after such a decree he
sues upon the bond, he thereby opens the decree, and admits the
right of the mortgagor to redeem; because by the institution of
the suit he disclaims the satisfaction he had obtained by the

(p) Holmes v. Wainewright, 1 Swan. 23; Cotterel v. Hooke, 1 Doug. 97.—(w)
Smart v. Wolff, 3 T. R. 342.—(x) Smith v. Woodcock, 4 T. R. 691.—(y) Mor-
rice v. The Bank, Cas. Tern. Tal. 222; Martin v. Kerridge, 3 P. Will. 240.—(z)
Powel Mortg. 204, 966; Toplis v. Baker, 2 Cox, 128.